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Abstract
One of the leading problems in cyber security today is the emergence 
of targeted attacks conducted by adversaries with access to 
sophisticated tools, sometimes referred to as Advanced Persistent 
Threats (APTs). These attacks target specific organisations or 
individuals and aim at establishing a continuous and undetected 
presence in the targeted infrastructure. The goal of these attacks 
is often espionage: stealing valuable intellectual property and 
confidential documents.
As trends and anecdotal evidence show, providing effective defences 
against targeted attacks is a challenging task. In this report, we restrict 
our attention to a specific part of this problem: specifically, we look 
at the Command and Control (C2) channel establishment, which, as 
we will see, is an essential step of current attacks. Our goals are to 
understand C2 establishment techniques, and to review approaches 
for the detection and disruption of C2 channels.
More precisely, we first briefly review the current state of cyber 
attacks, highlighting significant recent changes in how and why such 
attacks are performed. This knowledge is foundational to understand 
C2 techniques and to design effective countermeasures.
We then investigate the “mechanics” of C2 establishment: we provide 
a comprehensive review of the techniques used by attackers to set up 
such a channel and to hide its presence from the attacked parties and 
the security tools they use.
Finally, we switch to the defensive side of the problem, and review 
approaches that have been proposed for the detection and disruption 
of C2 channels. We also map such techniques to widely-adopted 
security controls, emphasizing gaps or limitations (and success 
stories) in current best practices.
We would like to acknowledge the help 
and support of CPNI in researching this 
topic and producing the accompanying 
products.
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Executive Summary
Formation and use of a Command and 
Control (C&C) system is an essential part 
of remotely-conducted cyber attacks. 
C&C is used to instruct compromised 
machines to perform malicious activity - 
C&C can also be used as a channel over 
which data can be exfiltrated. Statistics 
show that cyber attacks are widespread 
across all sectors and that preventing 
intrusion is difficult. A promising 
alternative consists of detecting and 
disrupting the C&C channels used by 
attackers: this effectively limits the 
damage suffered as a consequence of 
a successful attack (e.g., preventing 
sensitive data to being leaked).
C&C communication and traffic
Attackers experiment with alternative 
strategies to build reliable and robust 
C&C infrastructures and to devise 
stealthy communication methods. 
As a consequence, different C&C 
architectures and communication 
techniques have emerged. For example, 
attackers have used centralised 
architectures, based on the standard 
IRC and HTTP protocols. More recently, 
they have introduced decentralised 
architectures based on P2P protocols, 
which are more difficult to take down. 
Similarly, direct forms of communication 
have been substituted by encrypted 
channels, where attacker’s commands 
and stolen information cannot be 
readily accessed. To make channel 
detection and blocking more difficult, 
attackers also use covert communication 
mechanisms that mimic regular traffic 
patterns. For example C&C traffic can 
occur through pages and images on 
Online Social Networks (OSNs), covert 
DNS traffic, and networks for anonymous 
communication, such as Tor.
C&C detection and disruption
A variety of techniques for the detection 
and disruption of C&C channels have 
been proposed. They typically rely on 
the automated monitoring and analysis 
of network traffic to identify indicators 
of compromise, malicious traffic, or 
anomalous communication patterns. 
The importance of human involvement 
in this activity cannot be overstated. 
As attackers constantly adapt their 
strategies, it is critical to gain a thorough 
understanding of the traffic flow patterns 
followed by manual tuning of monitoring, 
detection, and response infrastructure at 
periodic intervals.
The following is a checklist of measures 
that help detecting and denying C&C in 
your organisation.
Detect known-bad network activity 
Collect and analyse network traffic to 
identify activity that is known to be 
caused by an active C2 channel.
•	 Monitor	DNS	traffic to identify 
internal devices that attempt to 
contact domains that are known 
to be involved in C2 activity. This 
measure involves collection of DNS 
traffic information (either through 
a passive DNS collector or via the 
nameservers logs) and matching 
of requests against one or more 
blacklists of malicious domain 
names.
•	 Monitor	IP	traffic to identify internal 
devices that attempt to connect 
to end points that are known to 
be involved in C2 activity. This 
measure involves collection of IP 
traffic information (for example, 
enabling NetFlow and sFlow 
collection in routers) and matching 
of communications against one 
or more blacklists of malicious IP 
addresses.
•	 Monitor	traffic	content to identify 
content that matches known 
C2 traffic (e.g., specific network 
request/responses signatures). This 
measure involves collection of full 
traffic content (for example, enabling 
a network sniffer) and matching of 
the collected data against traffic 
signatures.
These measures enable the detection 
of C2 channels that are set up by 
known malware families, leverage 
known infrastructure, or employ known 
communication techniques.
Detect anomalous network activity
 Collect and analyse network traffic to 
identify activity that deviates from the 
expected, normal traffic profile of the 
monitored network.
•	 Establish	traffic	baselines to 
determine the “normal” profile of 
the network (normal communication 
patterns, data exchange volumes, 
etc.). This measure can be 
implemented by determining 
baselines for different time windows 
(e.g., hour, day), internal devices, 
and network services.
•	 Evaluate	current	network	activity 
against the established baselines 
to identify deviations that may 
be indicative of C2 activity. Pay 
particular attention to anomalies 
such as periodic beaconing, surge 
in the amount of exchanged traffic, 
suspicious network behaviours.
•	 For example, C2 activity that 
relies on fast-flux techniques can 
be detected by searching DNS 
data for patterns of fast-changing 
associations between domain 
names and IP addresses; DGA-
based C2 activity is revealed in DNS 
data by use-and-discard patterns 
of domain names; data exfiltration 
may be detected in Net-Flow data 
by unusually large volumes of data 
exchanges.
These measures enable the detection of 
C2 channels that are set up by never-
seen-before malware families and that 
do not re-use any known malicious 
infrastructure.
Deny C2 activity 
Architect and operate the network in 
such a way that C2 activity is effectively 
denied or greatly impaired.
•	 Segment	the	network to separate 
devices with different trust and risk 
values (e.g., front-facing, publicly 
servers vs. internal hosts storing 
sensitive documents).
•	 Introduce	rate-limit	policies to slow 
down traffic directed to disreputable 
or un- trusted endpoints.
•	 Block	unwanted	or	unused	
communications	mechanisms	
that may be used to piggy back 
C2 activity (e.g., anonymisation 
networks, P2P overlays, social net- 
works).
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Introduction
We are currently in the middle of a 
computer security crisis: the number of 
attacks, their sophistication and potential 
impact have grown substantially in the 
last few years. In particular, targeted	
attacks, sometimes also called advanced 
persistent threats (APTs), have emerged 
as today’s most challenging security 
threat. Targeted attacks target specific 
individuals or organisations with the 
typical intent of obtaining confidential 
data, such as contracts, business 
plans, and manufacturing designs. 
They typically employ extensive 
reconnaissance and information 
gathering to identify weaknesses in 
the target’s defences, and rely on 
sophisticated malware to perform the 
intended actions (e.g., locate and steal 
sensitive documents within the target’s 
network).
Because of their nature, targeted attacks 
are particularly difficult to prevent. To 
in- trude and take control of the target’s 
systems, they may use 0-day exploits 
[11] or other malicious code that is 
known to evade the specific defence 
mechanisms used by the target. They 
may also rely on carefully-crafted social 
engineering techniques to “exploit the 
human”, that is to convince unsuspecting 
users within the targeted organisation 
to perform unwanted activities, such as 
installing and running malware.
An additional line of defence against 
targeted attacks is the detection and 
disruption of individual steps that are 
essential for the successful progression 
of an attacks. This is the so-called 
kill chain approach [19]. Of particular 
interest for a defender is identifying the 
step in which a compromised system 
establishes a Command & Control 
channel (C2), i.e., a communication 
channel with the attackers through which 
it can receive further commands or can 
send any stolen data.
Blocking an intrusion in the C2 
step has several advantages. If no 
sensitive data is ever exfiltrated, the 
targeted organisation limits its damage 
significantly: while the integrity of 
the organisation’s systems has been 
compromised, its most valuable 
assets (e.g., intellectual property and 
R&D plans) are still intact. Even in the 
event of successful data stealing, an 
understanding of the C2 structure could 
prove essential to determine what has 
been stolen and where it ended to. In 
addition, the analysis of the C2 channel 
may provide indications useful to 
attribute the attack to specific groups of 
people, which may facilitate legal actions 
against them.
The overarching goal of our study is to 
understand the techniques of Command 
and Control in order to improve our 
defensive approaches. We will examine 
C2 activity both from the attacker’s 
perspective (how	are	C2	channels	
set	up	and	maintained?) and from the 
defender’s perspective (how	are	C2	
channels	detected	and	disrupted?). 
Having an understanding of both sides 
of the problem (attacks and defences) 
is key to understand what attackers are 
currently capable of doing (or might do 
in the future) and what defences may be 
effective against them.
Our approach to the problem of 
understanding and combating C2 is 
based on a com- prehensive review, 
systematization, and contextualization of 
the substantive work in this area, done 
by both the academic and commercial 
community. For the academic work, 
we focus our attention on publications 
appearing in top conferences and 
journals, such as USENIX Security, 
ACM CCS, IEEE Security & Privacy, 
and NDSS. For the indus- try work, we 
review publications at conferences such 
as RSA and BlackHat, technical reports, 
and blog postings authored by the main 
security vendors. Whenever possible, 
we emphasise practical considerations 
extracted from these works, with the 
hope that they may lead to better 
defence mechanisms to be deployed.
The rest of the report is organised as 
follows: we start by covering some 
background
material on Command & Control 
(section C). We then review in detail the 
techniques that attackers use (or may 
use) to create and maintain C2 channels 
(section D). We review approaches 
that have been proposed to detect C2 
channels and disrupt them (section 
E). Finally, we revisit security controls 
that are commonly adopted by organ- 
isations to spotlight those that are more 
likely to successfully identify and disrupt 
C2 activity, and to identify any gaps in 
the current best practices (section F).
Practicalities
Start small, measure, and scale up: 
security controls can be applied itertively, 
covering first high-risks groups, idetifying 
mechanisms that are effective, and then 
expanding their applications to larger 
portions of the organisation.
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Command and Control identifies the step 
of an attack where the compromised 
system contacts back the attackers to 
obtain addition attack instructions and to 
send them any relevant information that 
has been collected up to that point. To 
really understand C2 activity, we need to 
review a number of aspects that, taken 
together, characterise today’s attacks.
In particular, we will examine the factors 
that shape the current attack landscape 
(why	targeted	attacks	have	become	such	
a	threat?). We also review the actual way 
in which the attacks attacks are carried 
out (how	does	a	targeted	attack	work?)	
and the reasons why C2 activity is a 
critical step in these attacks. Then we 
look at the available data on targeted 
attacks to quantify them and to learn 
some lessons specifically on C2 activity, 
before reviewing notable cases of 
targeted attacks.
C.1 Attack Landscape
The security field is co-dependent 
with an adversary. As the adversary’s 
motivations, drivers, or technical means 
change, so does the entire security 
landscape. We posit that changes in 
cyber attacks that have occurred lately 
(and that affect our ability to defend 
against them) are largely the result 
of several significant changes in the 
techniques and behaviours of attackers. 
We focus here on three main thrusts: 
changes in attackers’ motivations, the 
increased targeting of attacks, and their 
use of evasive techniques.
Motivations
The motivations of attackers have 
changed substantially, transforming their 
activity from a reputation economy to 
a cash economy [37]. Long gone are 
the days when attacks were performed 
predominantly by individuals with the 
intent to display their technical skills 
and to gain “street credibility”. The last 
ten years have seen instead the rise 
of criminal groups that use Internet-
based attacks to make a financial profit. 
Criminal groups can be well-organised 
and technically sophisticated. They can 
often rely on specialised “contractors” 
for different parts of the attack: for 
example, they may include a computer 
programmer for the development of 
actual attack code and a “cashier” for 
the monetization of stolen data. Less 
advanced groups can rely on the wide 
availability of commoditised attack 
tools, such as pre-packaged exploit kits 
[41] or phishing kits [24], which simplify 
considerably the steps required to launch 
relatively sophisticated attacks.
Notably, the activity of these groups is 
sufficiently well-established to give rise 
to active underground markets, where 
malicious code, stolen goods, tips and 
tricks are exchanged or sold [35]. An 
overview of cyber crime evidence for the 
UK has been recently published [76].
Traditionally, criminal groups have 
focused on getting access to financial 
data, such as credit card numbers and 
online banking account credentials, 
which can be easily monetized. This 
activity has been referred to as “cyber 
crime”, since it replicates traditional 
criminal activities (such as money 
stealing and fraud) in the online domain.
However, more recently attackers have 
increasingly targeted sensitive data 
different than financial, focusing primarily 
on acquiring intellectual property, 
such as manufacturing designs, legal 
contracts, etc. These attacks can often 
be classified as examples of industrial 
and commercial espionage.
A significant evolution in this line of 
changes to attackers’ motivation is the 
rise of State-sponsored attacks. With this 
term are denoted attacks that, for their 
scope, objectives, and cost, are likely to 
be mandated and funded by State-level 
entities. State-level attacks encompass 
two typical goals: the systematic and 
comprehensive espionage of other 
nations’ entire economic sectors with the 
objective of gaining strategic advantage 
[13], and the sabotage of critical national 
infrastructure, such as power plants 
and transportation control systems. 
The impact and consequences of these 
attacks have led some commentators 
to discuss the possibility of cyber wars 
[18]. The most well-known example of 
a State-level attack is Stuxnet, a worm 
believed to be created by the United 
States and Israel to sabotage a nuclear 
facility in Iran [69, 106].
Targeted Attacks
A second significant change that is 
relevant to our study of Command and 
Control is the increasingly targeted 
nature of attacks. Cyber crime activity is 
typically opportunistic: attackers cast a 
wide net and are happy with any target 
they can capture. More sophisticated 
attacks, on the contrary, take aim at 
very specific organisations or individuals 
and expend significant resources to 
compromise them.
This change in the mode of attacks 
has several important consequences. 
Attackers do not simply move from one 
potential victim to another, in search of 
the system that, being least defended, 
offers the easiest way in. Instead, 
attackers focus relentlessly on their 
selected target.
Second, the methodology of attacks 
change. In particular, the attack life-cycle 
includes a reconnaissance phase in 
which the target’s security posture and 
the defensive tools it uses are carefully 
examined and analysed to identify 
possible weaknesses [73]. In addition, 
a targeted compromise attempts to 
establish its presence on the victim’s 
systems for as long as possible, so 
as to reap the benefits of the intrusion 
over time. Consequently, the life cycle 
commonly includes phases in which 
the intruder moves “laterally”, i.e., gains 
access to additional systems, and 
introduces techniques to main- tain 
the attackers’ presence in the intruded 
system.
Actual attack artefacts, for example, 
malware samples or network-based 
attacks, tend to become unique: they 
are tailored to a specific target and, 
thus, are less likely to be reused in 
other attacks. This is problematic for 
security tools, which sometimes use 
the observation of the same suspicious 
artefact in multiple locations as an 
indication of maliciousness, and for 
security companies, which may prioritise 
the investigation of novel attacks and 
artefacts based on their prevalence. 
Security researchers are also less likely 
to develop signatures to match these 
rarely-seen artefacts.
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Evasions
The last aspect of modern attacks that 
we want to discuss in detail is their 
increasing use of evasive techniques. 
Attackers want to stay under the radar 
for as long as possible, to avoid being 
detected or raising alerts. To achieve 
this, they adopt a number of measures 
that, as we will see, have a significant, 
negative impact on the effectiveness 
of a number of traditional defence 
mechanisms.
Evading signatures
Traditional defence systems (such 
as traditional anti-virus and intrusion 
detection systems) often rely on 
signatures to detect attacks or malicious 
code. A signature characterises a known 
attack by defining its characteristics. For 
example, in the context of malware, a 
signature could be a regular expression 
that matches the bytes found in a 
specific malicious file. Unfortunately, 
a number of obfuscation techniques 
have been proposed (and are used 
extensively) to counter signature-based 
detection. For example, polymorphism is 
a technique that enables an attacker to 
mutate an existing malicious binary and 
create a completely new version from 
it, which retains its original functionality 
but is undetected by current signatures 
[52]. The anti-virus vendor Kaspersky 
recently reported detecting more than 2 
unique malicious samples per second, 
likely the result of extensive application 
of polymorphic techniques [64].
Evading dynamic analysis systems
To overcome the limitations of signature-
based analysis of malicious code, 
researchers use dynamic analysis tools, 
also called sandboxes [31]. These tools 
execute a binary in an instrumented 
environment and classify it as either 
benign or malicious depending on the 
observed behaviour.
To thwart automated dynamic analysis, 
malware authors have developed a 
number of checks (so-called “red pills”) 
to detect the presence of malware 
analysis tools and popular sandbox 
environments. When the malware 
detects indications that a malware 
analysis system is present, it typically 
suppresses the execution of malicious 
functionality or simply terminates 
[8]. The way in which the checks are 
implemented depends on the type of 
malware analysis system that is targeted. 
One class of checks inspects the runtime 
environment to determine whether an 
analysis tool is present. Often, such 
checks look for files, registry keys, or 
processes that are specific to individual 
analysis tools. A second class of checks 
exploits characteristics of the execution 
environment that are different between 
a real host and a virtualised environment 
[2, 33, 34, 105] or an emulated system 
[74, 88, 98] (which are frequently used 
to implement the analysis sandbox). For 
these checks, small variations in the 
semantics of CPU instructions or timing 
properties are leveraged to determine 
whether a malware process is run in an 
emulator or a virtual machine (VM).
As another evasive technique, malware 
may execute its malicious payload or 
spe- cific parts of its code only when 
some “trigger” fires, i.e., only when some 
specific precondition is satisfied [78]. 
For example, a malware program may 
check that certain files or directories 
exist on a machine and only run parts 
of its code when they do. Other triggers 
require that a connection to the Internet 
be established or that a specific 
mutex object not exist. Other malware 
becomes active only in a specific date 
range, when run by a user with a hard-
coded username, or if the system has 
been assigned a precise IP address. 
Furthermore, some malware listens for 
certain commands that must be sent 
over a control channel before an activity 
is started.
In the next step of the arms race, 
malware authors have started to 
introduce stalling code into their 
malicious programs [66]. Stalling code 
is executed before any malicious 
behaviour, regardless of the execution 
environment. The purpose of such 
evasive code is to delay the execution 
of malicious activity long enough so that 
the automated analysis system stops the 
analysis having observed benign activity 
only, thus incorrectly concluding that the 
program is non-functional or does not 
execute any action of interest. Of course, 
on a regular system, the malware would 
perform all of its malicious behaviour, 
right after the delay. Stalling affects all 
analysis systems (virtualised, emulated, 
or physical machines), even those that 
are fully transparent. This technique 
simply leverages the fact that, to analyse 
a large volume of programs, an analysis 
system must bound the time it spends 
executing a single sample to a limited 
time (in the order of few minutes). To 
make things worse, malware authors can 
often craft their programs so that their 
execution in a monitoring environment is 
much slower than in a regular system (by 
a factor of 100 or even more).
Evading reputation systems 
Another defensive approach that has 
gained traction in the last few years is the 
use of reputation information for network 
entities (servers or domain names). The 
idea is that if a client attempts to contact 
a domain or server with poor reputation 
it should be stopped, since that will 
stop also its exposure to potential 
malicious activity. Reputation data is 
often compiled into blacklists, i.e., list of 
domains and IPs that should be avoided, 
and distributed to devices that enforce 
the blocking of elements on the blacklist. 
For example, devices that may use 
reputation data include firewalls, proxies, 
and URL filteres.
Malware authors have a crude but 
effective attack against such reputation 
blacklists: they can use a certain server 
or domain for malicious purposes only 
for a very limited amount of time. After 
its IP or domain name is “tainted”, that 
is, has entered one or more blacklists, 
it is simply abandoned and no longer 
used. This strategy imposes additional 
effort and expenses on the attackers 
(they need to register new domain 
names or manage new servers with high 
frequency), but it is effective.
Recent data from researchers at Google 
shows that this strategy is in fact already 
well in use: they studied domains hosting 
exploit kits used in drive-by-downloads 
and found that their median lifetime is 
only 2.5 hours [41]. Clearly, an effective 
blacklist should be able to detect the 
malicious domain and distribute this 
knowledge to all the enforcement 
devices before the domain has been 
abandoned.
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C.2 Command and Control 
Activity
We have seen that today’s attacks are 
targeted, evasive, and aim at obtaining 
and exfiltrating sensitive data. How are 
these attacks carried out in practice? 
While the specific attack steps and their 
naming may vary across publications 
[19, 55, 73], the literature agrees on the 
general structure of targeted attacks, 
which is commonly represented as a 
sequence of steps similar to those of 
Figure 1.
Reconnaissance
This is where the attacker learns more 
about its target and identifies the 
weaknesses that will be exploited during 
the actual attack. The reconnaissance 
activity encompasses both computer 
systems and individuals. Attackers 
examine their target’s networks 
and systems by using traditional 
methodologies, such as port scanning 
and service enumeration, in search of 
vulnerabilities and misconfiguration 
that could provide an entry point in the 
organisation. Attackers also collect 
information about key people in the 
targeted organisation, for example by 
combing through data available on social 
media websites: this information will 
be used to facilitate later stages of the 
attack.
Initial compromise
This stage represents the actual 
intrusion, in which attackers manage 
to penetrate the target’s network. Most 
frequently, the method of compromise 
is spear phishing. A spear phishing 
message may contain a malicious 
attachment or a link to a malicious web 
site [125]. Often times, the content of 
the spear phishing message are tailored 
based on the information acquired during 
the reconnaissance stage, so that they 
appear credible and legitimate.
A second common method of intrusion 
is the strategic compromise of websites 
of interest to the victim (or “watering 
hole” attack). In these attacks, attackers 
place mali- cious code on sites that are 
likely to be visited by the intended target: 
when the target visits the compromised 
website, she will be exposed to one or 
more exploits. Watering hole attacks 
represent an evolution of the traditional, 
opportunistic drive-by-download attacks 
[95, 97], in which victims are attracted, 
by different means, to a malicious web 
page. The web page contains code, 
typically written in the JavaScript 
language, that exploits vulnerabilities in 
the user’s browser or in the browser’s 
plugins. If successful, the exploit 
downloads malware on the victim’s 
machine, which as a consequence, 
becomes fully under the control of the 
attacker [92, 96].
Command & Control
The Command & Control phase of the 
attack is the stage where adversaries 
leverage the compromise of a system. 
More precisely, compromised systems 
are forced to establish a communication 
channel back to the adversary through 
which they can be directly controlled. 
The C2 channel enables an attacker 
to establish a “hands-on-keyboard” 
presence on the infected system (via 
so-called remote access tools), to install 
additional specialised malware modules, 
and to perform additional malicious 
actions (e.g., spread to other machines 
or start a denial of service attack). 
Exfiltration
In this stage, the attackers extract, 
collect, and encrypt information stolen 
from the victim’s environment. The 
information is then sent to the attackers, 
commonly through the same C2 channel 
that was established earlier.
Of course, the exfiltration of data has 
been a key step in opportunistic attacks 
as well and it has been well documented 
in the literature. For example, studies 
of the data stolen (or “dropped”) by 
the key loggers components employed 
in banking trojans have reported on 
the amount of data being transferred, 
its estimated value, and the modus 
operandi of their operators [50]. 
Furthermore, researchers have sinkholed 
or hijacked entire botnets with the goal 
of gaining an inside view of the data 
stolen from infected machines and the 
operations of botmasters [114]. With 
respect to the exfiltration techniques 
seen in these traditional attacks, we 
expect targeted malware to expand 
more effort into disguising its exfiltration 
activity and its infrastructure.
Reconnaissance InitialCompromise
Command and
Control Exfiltration
Figure 1: Targeted attack life cycle
PAGE 7 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
The Command and Control Problem
Differences with other models
In this exposition, we have simplified the 
attack models discussed in the literature, 
to avoid distracting the attention from 
the main purpose of this study: the 
Command & Control phase. More 
detailed descriptions of other phases 
may be useful for readers focusing on 
other steps of the attack chain, such as 
the initial compromise.
In particular, Hutchins et al. [55] 
emphasise the steps required to perform 
the initial intrusion by introducing specific 
phases named Weaponization, Delivery, 
Exploitation, and Installation. Since we 
focus on the C2 stage, we group all 
these phases under the generic Initial 
Intrusion label.
Mandiant’s report [73] emphasises 
instead the steps performed by attackers 
after the initial compromise and leading 
to a persistent presence inside a target’s 
network. After a stage named Establish 
Foothold, the authors present a cycle 
of steps (Escalate Privileges, Internal 
Recon, Move Laterally, and Maintain 
Presence) that enable attackers to 
establish an expanded foothold inside 
the target’s network. The authors 
point out that these steps are optional 
and may not occur in all attacks. We 
consider these activities to be part of the 
compromise phase.
C.3 Statistics
It is notoriously hard to obtain adequate 
statistics on information security in 
general, and to measure the volume and 
impact of cyber attacks in particular. 
As a high-profile example of the 
difficulties of this task, a recent review 
has found significant flaws in a report 
[27] commissioned by the UK Cabinet 
Office from Detica, which provided high 
estimates for cybercrime’s annual cost to 
the UK [4].
The sources of data on cyber attacks 
have traditionally been surveys and 
telemetry collected by security vendors 
across their installation base. Both 
sources have their own issues [5]. For 
example, surveys often introduce bias 
by collecting most of their responses 
from large companies, which have the 
resources to collect the data requested 
by surveyors. In turn, statistics from 
security vendors have often been 
scrutinised for issues of over-reporting, 
which increases the perception of the 
risk involved with security threats and 
potentially favours the sales of a vendor’s 
product. To further complicate the matter, 
conclusions from different sources have 
sometimes been found to be significantly 
different, if not contrasting.
Recent legal developments may help 
the collection of meaningful security 
metrics: in the last few years, disclosure 
laws have been introduced requiring 
businesses to report security incidents 
involving the theft of personal data 
[15]. Such regulation may increase the 
collection of attack metrics available, but 
at the moment they only cover specific 
incident types and geographic areas.
Collecting sound statistics for targeted 
attacks seems especially challenging: 
this activity shares some of the same 
problems found with quantifying cyber 
attacks in general and it adds a few 
issues that are specific of this particular 
domain:
• The victims of targeted attacks are 
likely not willing to disclose the 
information that they have been 
attacked or, worse, breached. This 
knowledge may be embarrassing 
with customers and regulatory 
agencies, and the disclosure details 
may provide useful information to 
competitors (e.g., information about 
new product lines). Even more 
problematically, as we will see, 
targets may not know for a long time 
that they have been attacked.
• Targeted attacks span vast sectors 
of the economy, therefor, it may be 
difficult for any single entity (security 
vendor or governmental agency) to 
have a sufficiantly broad visibility of 
the problem.
• Different reporters may have 
different definitions for what counts 
as a targeted attack and for the 
reporting methodology. It is not 
unusual to encounter descriptions 
of targeted attacks from one vendor 
that other vendors classify as 
traditional attacks.
Even with these caveats in mind, we 
present here a number of statistics from 
different sources. We consider reports 
that provide (aggregated) data about 
targeted attacks. We do not, instead, 
include in our review reports that only 
describe the attacks in general. For the 
reasons we have discussed, the statistics 
reported here should be approached with 
a healthy dose of caution, in particular 
with regard to their ability to support 
general inference about targeted attacks; 
but they still provide a snapshot, an initial 
quantitative look into targeted attacks, 
offering some light on questions such 
as their pervasiveness and their usual 
targets. We hope that in the future more 
and better data on targeted attacks 
will be available, enabling more robust 
quantitative analysis of this phenomenon.
Mandiant Report
Mandiant is a security vendor providing 
incident management products and 
services to large institutions. Due to 
their business focus, Mandiant has built 
a reputation of dealing with targeted 
attacks. They publish a yearly report with 
findings from their engagements; the 
latest available report covers data from 
2012 [72].
Mandiant’s report suffers from some of 
the general problems we have discussed 
earlier. In particular, the sample size 
(the number of incidents) used as the 
basis of the report is not specified. 
Similarly, it is not clear if the incidents 
analysed in the report (those affecting 
Mandiant’s customers) are a sample set 
representative of the general population.
Nonetheless, the report contains a 
number of statistics that are worth 
discussing, as they offer an initial 
characterisation of targeted attacks. 
First, it discloses that only 37% of the 
intrusions were discovered by the victim 
itself: in the remaining cases, the victim 
was notified by some external party (e.g., 
law enforcement, customers, security 
vendor). The median time during which 
attackers are able to maintain a presence 
in the intruded network is reported to 
243 days, well over 8 months. They also 
report that in 38% of the cases, attacks 
are repeated, supporting the notion that 
attackers are persistent once they have 
identified an intended target.
The list of targeted sectors include: 
aerospace and defence (17% of the 
cases), energy, oil, and gas (14%), 
finance (11%), computer software 
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and hardware (8%), legal (7%), media 
(7%), telecommunications (6%), 
pharmaceutical (4%), other (25%). The 
report does not elaborate on how the 
business classification was drawn.
Symantec
Symantec is a large computer security 
company, focusing on virus protection. 
They publish a yearly report on the status 
of Internet security; the latest available 
data covers the year 2012 [120].
The report investigates targeted attacks 
on the basis of the targeted malicious 
emails identified by Symantec’s 
products. In total, the analysed dataset 
comprises about 55,000 attacks. The 
methodology used to discriminate 
whether a malicious email is targeted 
or opportunistic is intuitively presented, 
but there is no detailed description 
of the algorithm used to make this 
determination.
Out of this dataset, Symantec reports 
observing a number of targeted attacks 
per day ranging from 50 to about 225. 
The report warns that one large attack 
campaign in April against a single target 
would have significantly skewed results 
and, thus, has been removed from the 
presented results: while a reasonable 
course of action, this observation 
questions the sample size and 
generalizability of reported data.
Also in this case, the report lists the 
targeted sectors: manufacturing (24% 
of the cases), finance insurance and 
real estate (19%), other services (17%), 
government (12%), energy/utilities (10%), 
services professional (8%), aerospace 
(2%), retail (2%), wholesale (2%), and 
transportation (1%).
The report also comments on the size of 
the targets: 50% of the attacks targeted 
large organisations (those with 2,501 
employees or more), 31% small and 
medium business up to 250 employees.
The analysis of the malicious email 
dataset also provides some insight into 
the targets of the initial compromise: 
R&D personnel (27% of the attacks), 
sales (24%), C-level executives (17%), 
and shared inboxes (13%). Interestingly, 
the report points out a handful of 
significant changes from previous year 
data (for example, R&D personnel used 
to be targeted only 9% of the cases in 
2011 compared with 27% of 2012): it is 
not clear if these changes are an artefact 
of the data collection and analysis 
process or correspond to actual changes 
in the tactics of attackers.
Verizon
The telecommunication company 
Verizon publishes a yearly report on 
data breaches. The last available report 
at the times of writing covers 2012 
and contains data compiled from 19 
organisations for a total of of more than 
47,000 security incidents [127].
The report has a more general scope 
than those discussed so far (it covers 
data breaches in general), but it does 
provide some useful insights on targeted 
attacks. The report is characterised by a 
careful methodology, which is explained 
in detail.
The main findings relevant to our analysis 
is that 25% of the breaches they report 
on are targeted. The report confirms 
the elusive nature of attacks (targeted 
or not): 69% of breaches were spotted 
by an external party (9% customers), 
and 66% of the breaches took months 
or even years to discover. Another 
interesting observation is that, in most 
cases, the initial compromise does not 
require sophisticated techniques; in 68% 
of the cases it is rated as “low difficulty” 
and less than 1% as “high”. More 
worryingly, subsequent actions may be 
more sophisticated: 21% are high and 
71% are low. Unfortunately, the report 
does not break down these statistics 
between targeted and opportunistic 
attacks.
Discussion
As we have anticipated, the available 
data is unfortunately somewhat limited 
and the reporting methodology used 
to analyse it is not always sufficiently 
described. This limits our ability to make 
generalizations on the basis of the data 
sources that we have briefly listed here.
However, there are several points that 
are worth discussing, keeping in mind 
our objective of designing and deploying 
better defences against targeted attacks.
Ability to detect 
There seems to be support to the notion 
that attacks in general, and especially 
targeted ones, remain unnoticed 
for a long time. This indicates that 
organisations do not have appropriate 
controls, tools, and processes to 
identify the presence of intruders in 
their network. Unfortunately, we do not 
possess enough data to conclusively 
point to the precise reasons for why this 
occurs: in particular, it may be result of 
factors ranging from cultural ones, such 
as the lack of appropriate awareness to 
this specific risk (the “I’m not a target” 
mentality), to technological reasons, such 
as the unavailability (real or perceived) of 
effective defensive tools.
The failure to detect intrusions for 
months, if not years, also implies that 
attackers have a long time to carry out 
their attacks, compounding the damage 
inflicted on the target organisation. At 
the same time, from a defensive point 
of view, it shows an imbalance between 
two common defensive strategies 
targeting different steps in the attack 
kill chain: defending by preventing the 
intrusion and defending by detecting 
an intruder. More precisely, detecting 
the initial compromise requires to catch 
and identify the individual event that 
leads to the intrusion (e.g., the receipt 
of a specific spear phishing email or the 
visit of a specific malicious web site). 
This is an event that occurs in a specific 
point of time, and, lacking forensics 
capabilities, its detection requires that 
at that specific time some defensive 
tool (e.g., intrusion detection system or 
anti-virus tool) is capable of performing 
the detection. Intuitively, detecting the 
presence of an intruder may instead 
happen at any time after the intruder has 
established a presence in the target’s 
network, during which time defensive 
tools may be updated or improved. This 
situation flips the imbalance between 
attack and defence: while detecting the 
initial compromise requires that defence 
tools work effectively at all times (a 
single missed detection may lead to the 
compromise), to detect the intruder’s 
presence it is sufficient that the attacker 
makes a single mistake, revealing its 
presence.
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Targets 
Different sources provide different lists of 
targeted sectors. This could certainly be 
a result of the selection biases inherent 
in each source. However, what we can 
conclude by looking at the target lists 
provided, for example, by Mandiant and 
Symantec, is that any significant sector 
of the economy may be the target of 
attacks. Also relevant is the observation 
that an organisation size is not a 
predictor for being attacked or not:
organisations of any size, from small 
businesses to large corporations, have 
been attacked in the past.
In our context, this observation has 
important consequences. From an 
organisation point a view, the results and 
recommendations that we provide in this 
report should be generally applicable. 
From a vendor perspective, this points 
to the need of providing tools and 
mechanisms that are amenable to widely 
different organisations, with large ranges 
of technical skills, human resources, and 
budget numbers.
Sophistication 
Third, the Verizon report contains some 
preliminary data about the technical 
sophistication of attacks and, more 
precisely, it finds that a majority of the 
initial compromises are carried out 
with low difficulty techniques. While 
it is not clear if the same results hold 
when considering only targeted attacks 
(rather than looking at all kinds of 
attacks including opportunistic ones), 
this observation does match anecdotal 
experience from individual attacks, 
which often do not show particular 
sophistication, such as 0-day exploits or 
stolen digital certificates.
The lesson learned from this data point 
could be that, while defending against 
sophisticated attacks is becoming 
increasingly necessary, one cannot 
discard traditional attack techniques. 
C.4 Case Studies
In this section, we review a number of 
cases of targeted attacks. There exist 
many more accounts of attacks than we 
can report here; we decided to focus 
on those cases that show particular 
attack techniques and objectives, or 
that highlight the importance of C2 
detection. More precisely, we include 
a set of cases that have been publicly 
disclosed: these attacks affected high-
profile organisations and had egregious 
impact. We also include a set of cases 
that were provided by Lastline, a security 
company providing solutions to defend 
against advanced attacks. These cases, 
opportunely anonymised to protect the 
identity of the targeted organisations, 
are based on Lastline experience “in the 
trenches”, working with its customers, 
and draw attention to specific aspects 
of attacks or to problems with existing 
security approaches.
Political espionage
In January 2013, the New York Times 
publicly denounced that it had been 
subjected to targeted attacks for a 
period of four months. The attacks had 
been traced to Chinese hackers and 
were linked to an ongoing investigation 
at the journal that was highly critical of 
the Chinese political elite [91]. Further 
investigation of the attack methods and 
objectives linked the attack to a larger 
attack campaign targeting news and 
media companies, including Bloomberg 
News, which was compromised the 
previous year.
An investigation of the incident found 
that the attack activity showed some 
of the traits typical of targeted attacks 
originating from China: attackers hopped 
through com- promised accounts at 
US Universities, as a way to hide their 
identity and make investigation more 
complex, and they were suspected of 
using spear phishing to gain the initial 
access to the Times’ network.
The following steps of the attack fully 
reveal the targeted nature of the incident: 
the attackers obtained the passwords for 
every Times employees and used them 
to gain access to the personal computers 
of 53 of them. Then, they deployed code 
to search for and steal documents kept 
by reporters on the current investigation 
on Chinese politicians.
The Times article contains two pieces of 
information that are useful to illustrate 
the limitations of traditional security 
approaches that are based on the 
detection of the initial intrusion activity. 
The article comments that the spear 
phishing attack completely bypassed 
existing defences at the perimeter: 
“Attackers no longer go after our 
firewall. They go after individuals.”. 
The Times also reported that of the 45 
malware samples used in the course of 
the intrusion, only one was identified 
by the journal’s anti-virus tool, whose 
vendor later issued a statement reading 
“We encourage customers to be very 
aggressive in deploying solutions that 
offer a combined approach to security. 
Anti-virus software alone is not enough.” 
[122].
Military espionage
In May 2013, the confidential version of a 
report prepared by the Defence Science 
Board for the Pentagon was leaked to 
the Washington Post [83]. The report 
claimed that the designs for many of the 
US advanced weapons systems had 
been compromised by Chinese hackers. 
The report claimed that the extensive 
theft had targeted the documentation for 
several missile systems, combat aircraft, 
and ships.
While there are at the moment few 
details regarding how the intrusion 
actually occurred, it appears likely that 
the attacks targeted in particular large 
military contractors, which are involved in 
the design and production of the military 
systems.
This case study is a cogent example 
of attacks aiming at obtaining valuable 
intellectual property: sources from the 
Washington Post claimed the stolen 
designs were the result of 15 years worth 
of research and development.
Supply chain attacks
In February 2013, the security 
vendor Bit9 reported that it had been 
compromised [67]. Bit9 produces a 
whitelisting product, which specifies 
the list of software that should be 
allowed to run in a network; anything 
else is considered to be dangerous. 
As a consequence of the intrusion, the 
attackers managed to steal the secret 
certificate that Bit9 uses to sign its 
software releases. The company also 
revealed that some if its customers 
had received malware that was digitally 
signed with the stolen certificate.
Also in this case, the specific details 
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of the intrusion are not entirely clear. 
There are, however, several interesting 
aspects in this attack. First, attackers 
compromised Bit9 with the primary intent 
of acquiring the capability required to 
successfully attack upstream targets 
protected by the company’s products. 
These are often called “supply chain 
attacks” because they target one link 
of a chain that eventually leads to 
the organisation that is actually being 
targeted.
Manufacturing espionage
Military secrets are hardly the only ones 
to be sought after by attackers. In early 
2013, Lastline started monitoring the 
network of a manufacturer active in the 
field of fashion. During this monitoring, 
it determined that an internal server was 
infected: further investigation revealed 
an unexpected remote connection 
to that server originating from China. 
Among other data, the server contained 
all the designs of the manufacturer’s 
new collection, which had not yet been 
officially presented.
This episode shows that the data 
targeted by sophisticated attackers is not 
limited to highly confidential documents. 
Industrial espionage, in certain 
cases conducted with semi-official 
governmental blessing, has targeted a 
large spectrum of economic sectors [73]. 
Malicious infrastructure agility
In mid 2013, a Lastline product was 
installed at a professional services firm. 
Lastline detected a successful drive-by-
download attack against one of the firm’s 
employees. The drive-by had started 
when the employee visited a legitimate 
web site that had been compromised; 
the web site collects information relevant 
to the firm’s business. Additional drive-
by-download attacks were detected 
short thereafter, originating again from 
web sites belonging to companies and 
organisations in the same business field 
as the firm.
After one of the successful drive-by-
download attacks, connection attempts 
to a malicious domain were observed: 
the connections did not succeed 
because the destination server failed 
to respond. However, a day later, 
connections to the same domain were 
observed: this time, the server was 
responding and was actually distributing 
the configuration file of a widespread 
financial malware.
These events suggest that attackers run 
campaigns targeting specific business 
sectors (these could be considered 
less targeted versions of the watering 
hole attacks). Furthermore, the sudden 
activation of malicious domains shows 
that the malicious infrastructure used by 
attackers (exploit sites and C2 domains) 
can vary quite rapidly, thus requiring its 
constant and up-to-date monitoring.
Built-in polymorphism
This case study was collected after 
the installation of Lastline product in 
a University environment. Here, an 
administrative user received a malicious 
email and clicked on link contained 
therein twice in a short span of time. The 
link caused the download of a malware 
program. Interestingly, the binaries 
downloaded as a consequence of the 
user’s actions were different: they not 
only had different hashes, but they also 
received different scores on VirusTotal, 
an online service that scans submitted 
binaries with over 40 anti-virus tools.
This episode shows that the use of 
evasion techniques, polymorphism in this 
case, is a built-in component in many 
attacks: all the binaries downloaded in 
the course of the attack are (superficially) 
different. In addition, this case illustrates 
the importance of user security 
education: users are all too often a weak 
link in the security of an organisation.
C.5 A New Focus
There are several lessons that we can 
learn from the statistics on today’s 
attacks and the case studies that we 
have presented.
One is that preventing	compromises	
may	be	difficult. We have seen that 
intrusions happen, even at security 
conscious organisations which possess 
considerable domain knowledge, 
expertise, and budget for security. We 
have also seen that there does not really 
appear to be a sector that is immune 
from attacks: modern businesses and 
organisations handle on a regular basis 
confidential data of various nature 
(personal, financial, R&D) that is valuable 
to attackers. It should also be noted that 
the compromise may initiate outside of 
an organisation’s perimeter (and away 
from the defences that the organisation 
has put in place), and then spread inside 
it as the infected device re-enters the 
perimeter. For example, with bring-
your-own-device (BYOD) policies, 
organisations explicitly allow employees 
to bring on the workplace personally-
owned and managed mobile devices, 
such as smartphones, and to use these 
devices to store privileged data and to 
interact with internal systems.
As a consequence, it is clear that 
detecting	that	a	compromise	has	
occurred	is	critical. Ideally, the detection 
is performed as early as possible in 
the life cycle of the attack, to limit the 
damage that is suffered (for example, 
before confidential data is actually 
stolen). Unfortunately, we have seen, 
in particular with the Verizon data on 
breaches, that a significant number of 
infections go completely unnoticed for a 
long amount of time.
C2 detection and disruption seems 
to offer a solution to this problem: 
by focusing on the C2 phase of an 
attack, one accepts that a device may 
become under control of attackers, 
may enter organisation’s network, and 
may even acquire confidential data. 
However, the successful detection of 
C2 activity will preclude the attackers 
from performing the actual malicious, 
damaging activity of their actions, 
such as stealing confidential data. Of 
course, C2 detection should be seen 
as a complementary approach to the 
prevention of compromise, rather than a 
substitution for it: completely blocking an 
attacker, whenever possible, is preferable 
than having to deal with it after the fact.
With this approach in mind, we review 
in the next sections the techniques that 
attackers use to set up C2 channels, 
and then the approaches that have been 
proposed to detect and disrupt such 
channels.
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As we have already discussed there is 
a constant battle between the attackers 
(malware writers) and the defenders 
(security professionals), wherein the 
defenders find a new way to detect 
and block attackers, and in response 
the attackers come up with new, often 
novel ways of performing their C&C 
communication to evade the defenders. 
In this section we will discuss various 
techniques used by the attackers, 
including some in-depth case studies 
of actual malware that use them, and 
describe the general trends that the 
malware is exhibiting.
The command and control system 
for most modern malware has 
three components. These are 
controller discovery, bot-controller 
communication protocol and the C&C 
topology. In the controller discovery 
phase, the malware attempts to identify 
the location of the control system. The 
topology of the system may take many 
forms, falling into the broad categories 
of centralised and de-centralised. 
Finally, there is the actual method of 
communication from the malware to 
the controller. These three steps are 
often completely separated, and it is 
a common occurrence for malware to 
update one of these components while 
keeping the other components constant.
This section is structured as follows: 
first, we will give a brief insight into the 
trends in malware command and control 
over the years. We will then describe the 
various techniques used by malware to 
perform the three actions as described 
above. 
D.1 Overview
Over the years, the architecture of the C2 
channel has evolved substantially, driven 
by an arms race with detection-response 
mechanisms. The network structure 
(or topology) of the C2 channel has an 
intimate relationship with its resilience 
to attack and error, as well as scalability 
to larger numbers. C2 designers desire 
scalability, robustness to take-down 
efforts, and stealth – anonymity against 
detection.
C2 communication structure
Early C2 designs followed a centralised 
architecture such as using an IRC 
channel. In this design, administration 
and management tasks are simple 
and the architecture tolerates random 
losses of C2 nodes with little impact on 
efficiency. However, such a topology 
is fragile against targeted attacks — if 
the defenders can identify the channel 
and attack or take down the server, they 
effectively disable the C2 channel. Such 
fragile architectures were accompanied 
by poor software engineering practices. 
For instance, the address of this server 
was often hard-coded in to the malware 
and static in nature.
However, the growing size of botnets, as 
well as the development of mechanisms 
that detect centralised command-
and-control servers [10,12,40,43–
45,63,71,117,135], has motivated the 
design of decentralised peer-to-peer 
botnets. Several recently discovered 
botnets, such as Storm, Peacomm, 
and Conficker, have adopted the use of 
structured overlay networks [93,94,116]. 
These networks are a product of 
research into efficient communication 
structures and offer a number of 
benefits. Their lack of centralization 
means a botnet herder can join and 
control at any place, simplifying ability 
to evade discovery. The topologies 
themselves provide low delay any-to-
any communication and low control 
overhead to maintain the structure. 
Further, structured overlay mechanisms 
are designed to remain robust in the face 
of churn [47, 70], an important concern 
for botnets, where individual machines 
may be frequently disinfected or simply 
turned off for the night. Finally, structured 
overlay networks also have protection 
mechanisms against active attacks 
[16]. Fully decentralised topologies offer 
systematic resilience guarantees against 
targeted attacks on the C2 channel, 
yielding new forms of robustness. The 
vast power of peer-to-peer botnets from 
the use of resilient topologies comes at 
the cost of stealth; the unique structure 
can be also be used as a point of 
detection [82].
C2 communication traffic
Relationship	between	traffic	and	
structure. C2 evolution has also been 
driven by largescale defence efforts to 
isolate C2 traffic based on its unique 
traffic characteristics. Defence efforts 
to block unused ports and application 
protocols simply encouraged C2 
designers to tunnel their traffic through 
legitimate services, paving the way for 
the return of centralised architectures – 
C2 channels has been observed in the 
wild using comments in HTML pages or 
even actual blog posts on public forums 
to communicate. Since traffic is routed 
through legitimate services, defenders 
are effectively denied the option of 
disabling the service, as doing so would 
hurt legitimate interests.
Communication	traffic-pattern	anonymity.	
Other drivers of C2 techniques have 
been defence efforts arising from the 
application of statistical traffic analysis 
techniques. These range from simple 
anomaly detection techniques to 
sophisticated machine learning based 
detection. In response, C2 designers 
have adopted evasion techniques 
[87, 107] to hide traffic patterns from 
detectors. Such techniques mask the 
statistical characteristics of C2 traffic by 
embedding it within synthetic, encrypted, 
cover traffic. The adoption of such 
schemes only require minimal alterations 
to pre-existing architectures and can be 
adopted on a strap-on basis by other 
C2 operators. We can expect these 
techniques to mature quite well in the 
near future.
Communication	end-point	anonymity.	
An interesting development is that C2 
designers have adopted anonymous 
communication techniques within their 
architectures. Initial designs used simple 
anonymous proxies or stepping stones 
to route the traffic through a number 
of proxies to anonymise C2 traffic 
endpoints. More recently, C2 designers 
have started abusing systems designed 
for Internet privacy such as Tor, JAP, 
and anonymiser [30, 59]. End-point 
anonymity prevents defenders from 
isolating (and filtering) C2 hosts even 
if they can successfully detect traffic 
patterns.
Communication	unobservability. C2 
techniques in the form of practical 
unobservable communications have 
also been developed. These are 
especially powerful as they offer full 
unobservability; the strongest possible 
anonymity guarantee, subsuming both 
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end-point anonymity as well as traffic-
flow anonymity. Currently adopted 
techniques are based on the use of 
covert communication techniques. For 
instance, the application of probablistic 
information-hiding techniques such as 
image sharing behaviour on social
networks [81]. Emerging trends include, 
the use of uncompromised DNS servers 
as transient stores of C2 payloads.
Techniques to evade responses. The 
primary response mechanism against C2 
channel is to isolate domain names and 
IP addresses related to C2 activity. In 
response, C2 architects have developed 
techniques inspired by fault-tolerance 
literature. This is characterised by 
the evolution of domain generation 
algorithms (DGAs), and fast-flux 
networks which can allow large numbers 
of IP addresses to be linked to a single 
domain. 
D.2 Communication structure
Centralised architectures
Early C2 designs were based on a 
centralised architecture where one 
or more servers are exclusively used 
to coordinate C2 communication. 
The classic design for command and 
control in malware is to make use of an 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) server. IRC was 
developed in 1988, and is a protocol 
used for text chat over the internet. Its 
primary function is to provide “channels”, 
which are chat rooms allowing for group 
conversations (private user-to-user chat 
is also available but less common). 
Channels are hosted on servers, which 
in turn are part of IRC networks. While 
most channels are publicly accessible, it 
is possible to require authorisation to join 
a channel. User within a channel have 
varying levels of access (modes), which 
can define what that user can do within 
a channel. The channel itself has modes 
which define what each user mode 
can do, such as changing the channel 
topic, and other options regarding the 
channel (such as access authentication). 
All of this makes it a simple platform for 
malware communication. It provides 
a simple function for the attacker to 
deliver commands to the malware, and 
it’s equally simple for the malware to 
transmit information, such as collected 
data, back to the human controller.
Centralised architectures are simple and 
easy to manage, and robust to the failure 
of large numbers of malware-infected 
computers. In 2000, researchers [3] 
famously showed that while centralised 
architectures are robust to random 
failure, they are fragile against strategic 
attacks; removing the high-centrality 
components of the communication 
structure disables the C2.
Further, centralised C2 networks are not 
scalable. Supporting a large C2 network 
consisting of hundreds of thousands to 
millions of malware instances requires 
careful coordination amongst a large 
number of control servers, each servicing 
a few thousand or so malware instances.
Decentralised architectures
To counter the structural weaknesses 
and scalability limits of centralised 
architectures, many C2 designers are 
moving to decentralised or peer-to-
peer (P2P) architectures for command 
and control. The main design goals 
of these architectures are: scalability 
(nodes maintain a limited state and 
communication costs grow slower than 
the number of nodes), fault tolerance 
(requests can be routed around failed/
takedown nodes) and P2P nature 
(distributed architecture with no single 
point of failure and strong availability 
guarantees).
In a P2P network, there is no central 
control server; instead every member of 
the network acts (or can act) as a server, 
thus providing a load balancing property. 
Further, decentralisation ensures large 
amounts of redundancy against targeted 
attacks, consequently in comparison 
to centralised C2, any takedown effort 
will need to attack a significantly larger 
percentage of the nodes to completely 
disable the C2 network.
The use of decentralised C2 networks 
has heavily borrowed from P2P file 
sharing networks (used for both legal 
and illegal means). In a P2P network, 
each member communicates to a non-
uniform number of other members or 
‘neighbours’. Nodes only communicate 
with their neighbours in the network, 
with different variants of P2P networks 
providing different methods for the 
routing of data around the network. P2P 
networks can either be unstructured 
overlay networks ( Bittorrent, Gnutella, or 
Kazaa). Or, structured overlay networks 
such as CAN, Chord, Pastry, deBruijn-
based options (Koorde, ODRI, Broose, 
D2B), Kautz, Accordion, Tapestry, 
Bamboo, and Kademilia. We have named 
a few but there are many other options, 
which indicates the substantive depth of 
the design possibilities.
We will now take look at the typical 
operation of the Bittorrent network. To 
access a file on the network, the user 
downloads a tracker file, which contains 
a list of peers that hold some or all 
‘pieces’ of the file. The user then directly 
connects to these peers, and downloads 
the pieces they have. Eventually, you 
will have the entire file. The more users 
who are involved in the “seeding” 
(hosting) of file pieces, the faster the 
download speed. Obviously, currently the 
most common use for this technology 
is in the sharing of (often copyright) 
media files. The network can, though, 
provide an easy method for propagating 
information among a large number of 
users without the use of a central server. 
The typical situation for malware is that 
the malware will have a list of peers to 
which they are connected, and they 
will repeatedly check with these peers 
for new commands. The bot controller 
simply has to “upload” the commands to 
a single (or group of) nodes (which can 
be anywhere in the network), and the 
command will eventually reach all nodes 
through a flooding mechanism. This 
has the additional advantage that there 
is no need for a link between the data 
and the uploader, as is the case with a 
centralised system.
Case Study: Storm 
Storm is an good example of a botnet 
that uses a p2p network for its command 
and control. The Storm botnet, at its 
peak in 2007, comprised of anywhere 
between 1 and 50 million infected hosts.
Storm propagates solely through the use 
of spam emails, which contain links to 
either websites which take advantage 
of browser exploits, or prompt the 
download of malicious software. One of 
the first actions the malware performs 
is to make sure that the system clock is 
correct. This is vital for communication. 
Storm makes use of OVER- NET, which 
is a Kademlia based distributed hast 
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table (DHT) based p2p network. Each bot 
has an 128 bit DHT id, which is randomly 
generated. Routing is performed by 
computing the XOR distances of the 
IDs to the destination, node a which 
has a message for node d will forward 
to the peer (neighbour) with the closes 
id to d. Storm, like many p2p networks, 
uses a publish/subscribe style of 
communication. A node publishes 
information using an identifier generated 
from the contents of the information. 
Consumers can then subscribe to the 
information using the identifier. The 
bots compute identifiers to subscribe 
to using the day and a random number 
between 0 and 31. The controller can 
precompute these identifiers and publish 
information using them. The information 
published consists of a filename of the 
form ”*.mpg;size=*”, where * represents 
a 16 bit number. The malware converts 
this to an IP address and port number, 
at which point the malware performs a 
direct connection to talk to the controller 
directly. 
Social Networks
Social networks now play a huge part 
in many peoples lives. The benefits 
that they bring to both businesses and 
end users are hard to ignore. In fact, 
Facebook, the largest social network, 
now has over 1.1 billion users, and 
is currently the second most visited 
website (www.alexa.com) in the world. 
The sheer volume of social network 
traffic, plus the ability to easily host 
information within a social network page 
for little to no cost, has made them a 
very attractive tool to malware creators.
In this case, C2 channels are built as an 
overlay network over a social network, 
again both centralised and decentralised 
configurations are possible. Although 
social networks are largely based around 
a small number of highly well-connected 
central servers, it’s not possible to simply 
block the OSN due to their immense 
popularity with legitimate users. Further, 
online social network (OSN) providers 
have invested significantly in computing 
infrastructure. OSNs feature worldwide 
availability and load balancing, thus 
mitigating the traditional scalability limits 
of centralised C2 channels. They host 
a rich variety of content enabling the 
use of steganographic communication 
techniques, which we will discuss this in 
future sections of the report.
There have already been numerous 
examples in the wild of malware that 
uses social networks (or similar sites) 
as part or all of the command and 
control system. One (possible) botnet 
that has been found is an unnamed 
piece of malware that receives its 
commands through tweets posted to 
a particular Twitter account [132]. It is 
unclear however if in this case this was 
a researcher testing a new toolkit for 
Twitter command and control rather 
than an actual botnet. An example 
found by Arbor Networks [85] also 
demonstrates a botnet using Twitter as 
part of it’s C2 channel; in this case the 
twitter account posts base64 encoded 
URLs, which represent secondary C2 
servers. The same behaviour is also 
found on identically named Jaiku and 
Tumblr profiles. They also found a botnet 
that uses a malicious application on 
the Google App Engine cloud hosting 
platform which also returns URLs to 
which the malware will then proceed to 
connect to [84].
A confirmed piece of highly targeted 
malware that is using a social network 
as part of its command and control is 
Taidoor. Taidoor attacks organisations 
that have links to Taiwan (hence the 
name), and security firm FireEye have 
found that the malware has been 
modified to host the actual malware 
binaries in a Yahoo blog post [129]. 
The malware is initially delivered by 
email end performs an exploit against 
Microsoft Office, and a downloader is 
installed. This downloader connects 
to a Yahoo blog post, which contains 
seemingly random data. The data is in 
fact the actual malware binary, contained 
between two markers and encrypted 
using the RC4 stream cipher, with the 
resulting cipher-text being base64 
encoded. When decrypted, the data is 
a dll file containing the malware. The 
malware then connects directly to two 
C&C servers. 
D.3 C2 communication traffic
Communication pattern analysis. A key 
feature of C2 channels that distinguishes 
them from other malicious activity is 
the fact that the individual malware-
infested hosts communicate with 
each other. This lets them carry out 
sophisticated coordinated activities, 
but it can also be used as a point of 
detection. Traffic analysis techniques 
can be used to detect communication 
patterns among bots, and how such 
patterns can be used for more effective 
botnet countermeasures, and tradeoffs 
between botnet performance, resilience, 
and stealth. Traffic	analysis is an old 
field hence many of the techniques 
are applicable. We will review these 
in Section E. Consequently, C2 
designers have adopted techniques to 
hide communication patterns. Traffic	
analysis	resistance, is a much desired 
property by C2 designers. Anonymous 
communications technologies study 
the design of communication channels 
that are resistant to traffic analysis. 
For C2 designers, the ultimate goal 
is unobservable communications. 
The property of unobservability – the 
strongest form of communication 
anonymity – refers to the communication 
capability that a third party cannot 
distinguish between a communicating 
and non-communicating entity. For 
instance, by appearing indistinguishable 
from legitimate traffic, C2 activity will 
be effectively undetectable. There’s a 
substantial amount of knowledge in the 
public domain on the topic on which C2 
designers can build upon.
We now briefly review the current state of 
adoption of anonymous communications 
technology by C2 designers.
Tor
Tor (originally TOR:The Onion Router) is 
a service used to provide anonymity over 
the internet. It is used by governments 
and the public alike (for example it is 
extremely popular with whistle-blowers), 
and even receives a large proportion of 
its funding from the US Department of 
Defence. The basic system works by 
relaying internet traffic through a number 
of nodes, and applies multiple levels of 
encryption/decryption to mutate the 
traffic after each hop. It is extremely 
difficult to identify the original sender 
and receiver of packets sent over the 
network. This security has also made it 
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a target for malware coders, and there 
have been cases of malware that use 
the Tor network (and some of its extra 
features) to aid in command and control. 
To become a part of the Tor network, one 
simply has to install a simple piece of 
software. The machine can then act as a 
replay node for others, and make use of 
the Tor network.
One of the more advanced features 
of Tor is the ability to set up Hidden 
Services. These allow a server to hide 
behind a proxy, keeping the actual 
identity of the server hidden from those 
who access it. Hidden services work 
by setting up “Rendezvous” points. 
A rendezvous point is a node on the 
Tor network, whicis used as the entry 
point for the server. Traffic between 
the rendezvous point and the server 
is routed in the normal Tor fashion, 
providing anonymity. A rendezvous point 
is access using an “.onion” link.
While few examples of actual bots have 
been identified that use Tor as part of 
their C&C channel, there is growing 
evidence that this is occurring on a large 
scale. In late August/early September 
2013 the Tor network experienced a 
large increase in the number of users 
[29]. The actual amount of traffic on exit 
nodes, however, only showed a minimal 
increase. This was eventually identified 
to be down to the SDC botnet [134]. 
The SDC botnet hosts its command 
and control server behind a Tor hidden 
service. The botnet, however, shows 
little activity, and is believed to simply be 
used for installing other malware.
Case Study: Skynet 
Skynet is a moderately-sized ( ̃12000 
machines) botnet based upon the Zeus 
family of malware. The interesting thing 
(apart from the usage of Tor) about 
Skynet is that its operator hosted an 
IAmA (Q&A) session on Reddit 1. When 
a team of researchers [46] discovered 
an instance of the malware, they were 
able to use the information provided by 
the Reddit post, plus a small amount of 
reverse engineering, to provide an almost 
complete profile on the operation of the 
botnet.
The malware is spread primarily through 
the Usenet file sharing network, and is 
primarily used for DDoS attacks, data 
mining and Bitcoin mining. When the 
malware is installed onto a machine, the 
Tor client for Windows is also installed, 
and a Tor hidden service is set up for the 
machine itself. All C&C communication 
is performed over a Tor SOCKS proxy 
running locally on the machine. The 
hidden service is opened on port 55080.
The primary method of C&C is an 
IRC server hosted behind a Tor 
hidden service. The server runs at 
“uy5t7cus7dptkchs.onion” on port 
16667. The controller issues com- mands 
to the malware through the IRC channel. 
These actions can include performing 
attacks and returning info on the host 
machines.
The malware also includes a version of 
the Zeus malware family. Zeus is a very 
common banking trojan, with a primary 
goal of stealing personal financial 
details (for example credit card numbers 
and online banking passwords). Zeus 
provides a web- based C&C server, 
which the controller has hidden behind a 
second Tor hidden service. By accessing 
the control server, the researchers were 
able to recover a XML file con- taining 
the current target websites.
The final component of the malware 
performs Bitcoin mining. The malware 
includes the open source “CGMiner” 
software used for Bitcoin mining, which 
connects to a number of Bitcoin mining 
proxy servers. Interestingly, seven IP 
addresses for proxy servers were found, 
of which two were active, but none were 
hidden by Tor.
Due to the use of Tor, it is almost 
impossible to identify the actual location 
(and owner) of the command and 
control servers. Through responses 
on the Reddit post, plus the botnets 
concentration in central Europe (in 
particular the Netherlands and Germany) 
there is a strong chance that the operator 
is based in Germany.
Unobservable C2 
Communications
Whereas systems such as Tor aim to 
provide anonymity through unlinkability 
(i.e. disguising who is talking to whom), 
unobservable communication methods 
aim to hide the fact that anyone is 
communicating altogether. Tor, and 
similar systems, are designed to provide 
low-latency communications but this 
is often difficult to achieve when using 
unobservable communication methods, 
which often provide a higher-latency for 
of communication. While this is often 
deemed unacceptable for the user-base 
of Tor like systems where usability is 
a factor, it is not an issue for malware 
coders. The most common form of 
providing unobservable communications 
is through the use of steganography.
1 http://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/
comments/sq7cy/iama_a_malware_
coder_ and_botnet_operator_ama/
Steganography (Greek: “concealed 
writing”) is the art of writing messages 
in such a way that nobody, apart from 
the sender and receiver, suspects 
the existence of the message. 
Steganography is an art that has been 
used for thousands of years, and has 
been reinvigorated in the digital age. The 
main purpose of using steganography 
is that it can make the communication 
unobservable. There are two ways 
in which steganography can be used 
by malware to hide the command 
and control communications. The 
first is that the malware can make its 
communication protocol appear as 
another, and secondly it can embed 
itself within otherwise legitimate content 
online, such as images.
Today most media types, including 
text, images and video, are capable of 
contain- ing hidden data in a number of 
ways. In the simplest cases, this can be 
achieved by adding extra metadata to 
files to store the required information, 
although this is easily discovered. The 
alternative, and more advanced, method 
is to change the actual file contents 
itself. For example, in a image file the 
least significant bit of each pixel in the 
image can store the data. This will allow 
a relatively large amount of data to be 
stored (directly corresponding to the size 
of the image), and to the untrained eye 
the image will appear to be unchanged. 
Unobservable C2 
Communications
In a audio file, the data can be hidden 
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by introducing an echo, with the amount 
of delay indicating the data (the delay 
will be in the 10s of milliseconds so 
unobservable to the untrained ear). 
There are numerous algorithms for 
steganography, providing differing levels 
of unobservability and modification 
resistance (the classic way to remove 
image steganography, for example, is to 
resize or slightly distort the image).
Currently, there are very few examples of 
steganography being used by malware 
in the wild. It is expected, however, 
that the amount of malware making 
use of steganography will increase 
as command and control detection 
methods become more advanced and 
difficult to circumvent using traditional 
means. Therefore, this section will 
mainly deal with proposed designs 
for steganography-based malware 
command and control.
One example of real world malware 
using a form of steganography is the 
Trojan.Downbot Trojan [137]. Trojan.
Downbotspreads through targeted 
emails, and the first thing it does is to 
access an attacker-controlled website, 
for which the address is hardcoded into 
the malware itself. The website is made 
to look like a code tutorial site, and to 
anyone who happens to access them 
legitimately the website will appear 
completely harmless. If the page source 
is analysed, however, it can be found 
that the source contains specially 
formatted and encoded comments in 
HTML files, or extra bytes in image files. 
These comments and images contain 
the command and control commands for 
the malware, including a command for 
the malware to contact a specific IP/port 
combination (to upload collected data). 
This technique is effective as all the 
command and control communication is 
performed over HTTP and would appear 
in logs to be normal web browsing 
behaviour, and to block all HTTP 
traffic would cause usability issues for 
legitimate users. 
Case Study: Stegobot 
Stegobot is a proposed design for a de-
centralised botnet with an unobservable 
C2 protocol based upon steganography. 
The system utilises the existing user 
behaviour of the uploading of digital 
images to a social network, and the 
subsequent broadcast of these images 
to all of the users connections.
The social network that is the focus 
of this paper is Facebook. The typical 
activity of Facebook is that a user 
uploads an image through the web 
interface, and while they are browsing 
the “news feed”, the recently uploaded 
images of their connections are 
downloaded to a temporary folder 
on the local machine. The malware 
operates as a proxy - when an image 
is uploaded data is inserted into it 
before it is uploaded. The malware 
also attempts to extract data from the 
temporarily downloaded images, storing 
any recovered information. The malware 
is designed for information collection, in 
particular bank details and passwords. 
Commands are issued by the controller 
at some point in the network (note: this 
can be from any of the bots with with 
equal probability), and the command 
is then propagated through the use of 
flooding. Collected data is returned to 
the controller in the same way.
The system uses a steganography 
algorithm that is hard to detect 
automatically (YASS), so provides 
reliable unobservability. The C2 system 
creates no extra web traffic as it uses 
exclusively the normal browsing habits 
of the affected users. When simulated 
on a social network of 7200 nodes, the 
bot controller can receive up to 86.13MB 
of data per month, which may seem 
like a small amount, but can represent 
many thousands of bank details and 
passwords.
D.4 Evasion
DNS
The Domain Name Service (DNS) 
is a naming system for computers 
on the Internet. It’s a basic piece of 
infrastructure that translates human-
relatable computer resource names to IP 
addresses which can be used to route 
information. Attackers extensively use it 
to build and operate the C2 channel. 
DNS Fast Flux 
One of the major positive points for 
malware coders is that the IP addresses 
returned by an DNS request do not 
need to be static. This property is 
used by legitimate services through 
the use of Content Delivery Networks 
(CDNs). CDNs are used by large-scale 
web services (such as Amazon and 
Facebook) for a number of purposes, the 
primary purpose being to enable the use 
of multiple servers around the world, so a 
user can access content closest to them. 
It is also useful to aid in load balancing 
and provides extra redundancy in case of 
failure. In a CDN, a typical DNS response 
will contain multiple IP addresses, all 
of which are valid. The user will then 
connect to one of these. The returned 
IP addresses will typically have a TTL 
measured in hours or days. This is so 
that the effects of DNS caching can 
be felt; if the TTL is too short effective 
caching of results cannot be performed. 
Repeat request for the same domain 
from the same location will in general 
return the same set of IP addresses, 
possibly with some differences if the 
CDN needs to load balance.
An variation on a CDN is a Fast-Flux 
Service Network (FFSN) [51], in which the 
command and control server is hidden 
behind a wall of compromised machines, 
which are often part of a botnet. Each 
of these compromised hosts acts as a 
sort of “proxy” to the C&C server; each 
time they receive a request for the server 
they will forward it, and will return replies 
to the original requester. Each of these 
hosts will have a unique IP address, 
which can be used to access the server. 
For example, an FFSN comprising of 
10,000 compromised machines provides 
up to 10,000 IP addresses that can all 
point to a single server.
The FFSN operates as follows. The 
domain of the server is public. A host 
wishing to contact the server makes 
a DNS request for the domain, and is 
returned a set of IP addresses, and then 
connects to one of them. This sounds 
familiar doesn’t it? This part of a FFSN 
is almost identical to a CDN except for a 
few small differences. First, the returned 
IP addresses returned will not be for 
the actual controller(s), rather they will 
point to compromised machines within 
the flux network. Second, the returned 
IP addresses will have a very short TTL, 
measured in minutes (rather than the 
days as is the case in a CDN). A second 
request will in most cases return a 
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completely different set of IP addresses. 
This is the fast-flux behaviour; the 
malware controller has no control over 
which of his compromised hosts are 
online so the returned IP addresses 
needs to change frequently to increase 
the risk that a hot is available.
DNS as a Medium 
It is also possible to use the DNS system 
as a communication channel rather than 
just as a way to set up the channel. One 
example of this being used in the wild 
is Feederbot [28]. Feederbot makes use 
of the fact that the RDATA field in a DNS 
response can be of multiple types, not 
just an IP address. One of these is TXT, 
which as the name suggests means 
actual text can be transmitted. Feederbot 
uses TXT replies to transmit data. The 
commands are encrypted and the 
encoded into base64 (which resembles 
random text). The remainder of the DNS 
response packet uses valid syntax, 
making detection difficult.
While Feederbot is optimised for one-
way command and control, in most 
cases the malware will need to transmit 
information back to its controller. 
Seth Bromberger, working for the 
US Department of Energy, proposed 
a system for exfiltrating data from 
organisations by making use of DNS 
requests. In this case, the domain name 
that is being queried contains the data 
to be transmitted. The attack works as 
follows. The attacker sets up a domain 
name (evil.com) and makes sure 
that he has control of its authoritative 
nameserver (nameserver.evil.com). Say, 
for example, an infected hosts wishes to 
transmit the data “Super Secret Stuff” 
back to its controller. It will simply make 
a DNS request for evil.com, pre-pending 
the data to the domain (so the request 
will be for super.secret.stuff.evil.com. 
The data can be encrypted before 
pre-pending to prevent the contents 
of the data being identified. When the 
request reaches the attacker controlled 
nameserver (nameserver.evil.com), the 
attacker can simply read off the data. 
The attacker can also send commands 
back to the malware in the response, 
either by using the method of Feederbot, 
or by, for example, using specific IP 
responses to indicate a particular task 
to be performed. A similar approach 
is proposed by Xu et al [133], who 
extend this idea to also include traffic 
patterns for the communication to avoid 
detection, for example by only creating 
DNS queries when the host machine is 
making them.
A second example of malware that 
makes use of the TXT record is the 
W32.Morto worm [79]. In this case, 
DNS requests to harcoded domains 
return encrypted binary signatures and 
IP addresses in TXT responses. The 
malware then downloads a binary from 
the included IP address. It is also rather 
peculiar in that there are no A records for 
the domains, only TXT records, indicating 
that the domains are used for the sole 
purpose of controlling the worm. 
Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA)
One method of providing resilience to 
both detection and reverse engineering is 
the use of Domain Generation Algorithms 
(DGAs). The function of a DGA is to 
allow the malware to programmatically 
generate domains for which it attempts 
to access a command and control server. 
It is then up to the attacker to ensure 
he controls the domains that will be 
generated.
A DGA will often be reliant on factors 
such as the current time or date, and the
result should be consistent across 
multiple hosts. The malware will 
repeatedly run the algorithm to generate 
a domain and attempt to connect. The 
attacker can also run the algorithm, in 
advance, and register the domains when 
they are required to use as a temporary 
command and control server.
The main benefit to an attacker of a DGA 
is that they allow for a large amount of 
redundancy in the command and control 
server. The controller, at any one time, is 
short lived and so if one is taken down, a 
new one will be available in little time.
For example, the Conficker malware 
will generate 250 domain names every 
three hours, based upon the current 
UTC date [94], The same domains are 
generated every three hours (8 times 
per day). The malware will do an lookup 
on every generated domain, and will 
attempt to contact every domain that 
has an assigned IP address to download 
binaries. 
Case Study: Torpig 
Torpig is a botnet that is designed to 
steal personal information. In 2009, a 
team of researchers were able to take 
control of the botnet for a period of ten 
days, in which time they were able to 
document the operations of the botnet 
in its entirety [114, 115]. One of the 
key points of the Torpig botnet is that 
it makes use of a domain generation 
algorithm. Each bot independently uses 
a DGA to generate a set of domains 
based upon the current time. They then 
attempt to connect to each of these in 
turn, until one succeeds (i.e., the domain 
resolves to an IP address and the server 
replies with a valid response). The 
botmaster also computes the domains 
and registers them, usually with less than 
honest domain registrars, before they 
are generated, with the goal of getting 
at least one online. (The researchers 
were able to take control by beating 
the botmaster to it and registering the 
domains, effectively sinkholing the 
botnet).
Future: Protocol Mimicking
One area of research that has grown 
recently is the area of protocol 
mimicking. The idea is to hide certain, 
noticeable communications by making 
them seem like they belong to a different 
protocol. The main area of focus on 
this so far is in obfuscating Tor traffic. 
In many cases it can be dangerous to 
use Tor, and it exhibits very noticeable 
communication patterns.
There are a number of systems that 
attempt to make Tor traffic appear as 
Skype traffic. As Skype is a widely used, 
low-latency and high bandwidth system, 
it is ideal to emulate. SkypeMorph [77], 
for example, attempts to make Tor traffic 
appear as a Skype video call. Both the 
client and the bridge node run the Skype 
client on a high numbered UDP port, and 
the client sends a Skype text message to 
the bridge containing its IP, UDP port and 
public key. The bridge replies with the 
same information. The client then starts 
a video call to the bridge, which it does 
not answer. Instead, the call is dropped 
and instead the encrypted data is sent 
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over UDP between the ports opened for 
Skype. Once data communication starts, 
Skype is exited on both the client and 
bridge.
A slightly different approach is taken 
by StegoTorus [131]. In this system, 
Skype is not actually used, instead 
entirely new traffic is created that follows 
the traffic pattern from a previously 
collected Skype network trace. Packets 
contain simulated headers that match 
realistic Skype headers. The system 
also uses a similar approach with HTTP 
by generating fake HTTP requests 
from clients, and fake HTTP responses 
from the server to transmit data (which 
appear as normal HTTP browsing). The 
HTTP requests are replays based upon 
previously collected traces, with header 
information replaced with the data to be 
transmitted. The same approach is used 
for the responses from the server, except 
the data is hidden within the returned 
content (such as PDF and JavaScript 
files).
A third, completely different system 
is CensorSpoofer [130]. This system, 
designed for obfuscated web 
browsing, decouples the upstream and 
downstream channels. HTTP requests 
are sent to the server over a low capacity 
channel such as email or instant 
messaging. The server responds to the 
client by mimicking UDP-based VoIP 
traffic, by mimicking the traffic from a 
dummy P2P host, more specifically SIP-
based VoIP.
All three of these approaches were 
deemed broken by Houmansadr et al. 
[53], who proved that all three systems 
are detectable due to their lack of 
complete protocol emulation. All three 
systems do not fully emulate all aspects 
(for example, error handling) of the 
protocol that they are attempting to hide 
as, allowing for detection by comparing 
the system traffic to legitimate traffic. 
While this has debunked these three 
systems, there is ongoing work to make 
systems like these less detectable. Even 
though this approach has not been seen 
in malware yet, it is fully expected that 
malware will start to take this approach 
in the near future. At the simplest level, 
malware that makes use of social 
networks is starting to adopt this 
behaviour by mimicking HTTP traffic.
A 2013 report from Symantec [121] 
details an targeted attack against a 
major internet hosting provider in which 
malware was installed on linux servers 
which opened a backdoor. The backdoor 
operated as a network monitor which 
scanned all traffic entering the system 
over SSH (and other protocols). The 
monitor looked for a certain sequence of 
characters, namely “:!;”. If this flag was 
seen, the malware extracted encrypted 
and encoded data which followed. 
The data could be embedded in any 
incoming traffic, making it very difficult to 
detect. 
Future: Namecoin
Another further development that is 
beginning to appear in the wild is the 
use of the Namecoin service. Namecoin 
is related to Bitcoin, and provides a 
decentralised method to register and 
control domain names. Domains that 
belong to the Namecoin service use the 
“.bit” top-level domain. The advantage 
to a malicious user is that is provides 
the means to anonymously purchase 
a domain outside the control of any 
international body. McCardle et al [75] 
have found malware that is using this 
service in the wild, and it is expected that 
ti will become more widespread.
Future: Esoteric C&C Channels
It is also expected that attacker will 
make use of further unusual channels for 
command and control in order to evade 
controls. A common control is to provide 
an “air gap” around a machine – i.e. the 
machine is physically disconnected from 
any other machine, including the internet. 
In the perfect situation, this would be 
a laptop disconnected from the power 
supply (data can be transmitted through 
power cabling, a method that is used 
in the consumer “Powerline” network 
adapters). Recently, however, Hanspach 
and Goetz [49] have proposed a design 
for malware that can operate even in the 
face of an air gap. The proposed channel 
is to make use of the microphones and 
speakers found in most laptops in order 
to transmit data between machines 
using inaudible frequencies. Using this 
channel, a data rate of approximately 
20bit/s up to a range of 19.7m can be 
achieved. By extending the system into a 
mesh network, multi-hop communication 
can be achieved. While 20bits/s seems 
low at first, it is more than enough to 
transmit small amounts of data such as 
passwords, banking details or memory 
dumps. 
D.5 Future Trends
As malware writers attempt to make their 
malware more resilient to take-down 
attempts and detection, there are a 
number of trends that we can expect in 
the near future.
First, the use of decentralised malware 
will increase. This will be both down to 
the additional redundancy provided by 
a decentralised network, and also the 
scalability provided by such systems, 
as it is also expected that botnets will 
continue to increase in size. We expect 
that the malware designers will start to 
use resilient network designs offered by 
scientific literature.
Second, the use of anonymity services 
will also increase. As it is harder to avoid 
detection, and it is getting easier for 
authorities to locate malware operators, 
the operators will increasingly want to 
minimise the risk that they are identified. 
Services such as Tor will therefore 
become more widespread.
Finally, although in the wild it is currently 
extremely rare to find examples, there 
is a high probability that techniques 
involving steganography will become 
more widespread. This will allow the 
malware to use legitimate services to 
transmit information, i.e. by hiding in 
plain sight. This will vastly reduce the 
effectiveness of most current detection 
methods.
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Given the range of C2 design techniques, 
there is much interest in the design of 
techniques to localise C2 communication 
traffic by exploiting its special nature. 
Detection techniques can be used to 
carry out such analysis effectively on 
large scale networks to engage with 
malicious network activity. In recent 
years, a number of new techniques have 
been proposed to mine complex traffic 
data in order to support correlation and 
fusion using innovations from the fields 
of machine learning, semantic analysis, 
information theory, and traffic analysis.
C&C detection falls broadly into two 
categories: signature-based and non-
signature based. In signature-based 
detection, the detection algorithms are 
designed to look for known patterns 
of behaviour collected from malware 
samples (or “signatures”). These 
algorithms are often good at detecting 
the C&C of particular malware, but not 
so good at detecting new malware. 
Host-based anti virus systems usually fall 
into this category. Non-signature based 
algorithms instead look for anomalies 
compared to the norm. They are often 
much more adaptable to new variants 
of malware, but may not perform as 
well against known malware. Further 
to this, there are three different targets 
for detection, each requiring differing 
approaches for detection. These are 
infected hosts, command servers and 
the communication protocol.
There are two primary measures of 
the success of a C&C detection, true 
positive rate(TP) and false positive rate 
(FP). The true positive rate measures the 
percentage of malicious samples that are 
labelled correctly as malware, while the 
false positive rate measures the number 
of legitimate samples that are incorrectly 
labelled as malware.
E.1 Measurement and Data 
Collection
When detecting malware C&C, the 
selection of which data to collect and 
analyse is extremely important. For 
example, varying detection methods 
require different levels of detail in the 
data. As networks scale, it will get 
increasingly harder to store all traffic 
— a requirement of most enterprise C2 
detection techniques. Thus, if C2 traffic 
traces go unrecorded, then detection 
systems cannot work.
Current measurement techniques have 
addressed scalability limitations of data 
collection by developing measurement 
architectures for aggregation and 
sampling. However they do so 
without addressing evasion resilience 
requirements. Also, little attention has 
been paid to measurement control 
mechanisms — tuning measurement in 
response to C2 evasion.
E.2 Scalable measurement
Traffic monitoring is performed by 
routers, commonly using Netflow [17] 
feature or the sFlow feature. Alternatively, 
standalone measurement devices [25] 
observing traffic via network mirroring 
devices or splitters (optical or electrical) 
are more flexible than in-router methods. 
In both cases, traffic traces are exported 
to collectors which store the traces.
Enterprise networks carrying a few 
tens of terabytes a day, resulting in 
tens of giga- bytes of flow records are 
currently manageable as all records can 
be collected. However, the growth in 
network speeds might change this in the 
future. Additionally, C2 designers can 
attack the measurement system to evade 
detection. For instance, by flooding the 
finite-storage data collectors. Network 
defenders would thus be forced to 
switch to sampling network traffic as 
storage of complete traffic flow records 
could be impossible under conditions of 
flooding or network congestion.
In the case of ISPs, the volume of traffic 
flow records is immense. A tier-1 ISP 
carries several tens petabytes of user 
traffic per day [1], resulting in hundreds 
of terabytes of flow records. Even with 
low storage and transmission costs, 
storing entire traffic traces beyond a few 
days is not feasible for ISP traffic while 
storing the entire traffic including packet 
data is outright impossible.
The volume of traffic on ISP networks 
presents a challenge which requires 
collectors to summarise trace data. This 
can be done either via summarisation 
techniques or via sampling techniques. 
Unlike high-level summaries produced 
by summarisation techniques, sampling 
techniques produce fine-grained 
traces that are representative of 
complete network traffic data. Sampling 
techniques can support the creation 
of arbitrary sub-aggregates to support 
detection techniques that need not be 
specified at the time that sampling takes 
place.
The challenge is to achieve the following 
requirements: 1. Fairness: yield accurate 
estimates about traffic based on the 
samples 2. Confirm to the sampling 
budget – the maximum number of 
samples to be gathered from data 
arriving within a specified time period. 3. 
Timeliness: provide samples in a timely 
manner to detection mechanisms.
Fairness is an important criteria. If 
the fairness guarantees are weak or 
non-existent, then the adversary can 
exploit weaknesses in the sampling 
algorithm. This can result in the C2 traffic 
evading the monitoring system, as a 
consequence detection would fail.
In the rest of this section section, we will 
briefly outline the main methods of data 
collection that are used by the detection 
methods discussed later.
NetFlow
NetFlow is a network protocol for 
collecting IP traffic information. 
Developed by Cisco, NetFlow is used 
to collect and monitor network traffic 
flows at the router level. It is the current 
industry standard for traffic monitoring 
due to its low overhead but high level of 
detail.
NetFlow data represents “flows” of 
traffic. A flow is defined by Cisco to 
represent a unidirectional sequence 
of packets between a single source-
destination pair. As an example, NetFlow 
data could consist of the following:
• Source IP
• Destination IP
• Source Port
• Destination Port
• Protocol (e.g. TCP, UDP)
There are numerous other traffic flow 
features that can also be stored, 
including timestamps, byte count, and 
headers. One of the key points, however, 
is that the actual payload data is not 
stored. This is due to the fact that the 
storage requirements would increase 
dramatically if all data is stored as well (if 
you imagine a 1Gbps router logging for 
just 1 day would create 7.2Tb of data to 
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store and process!).
Honeynets/Malware Traps
Honeynets and malware traps are 
essentially bait and traps for malware in 
the wild. A honeynet is typically made 
up of a number of honeypot nodes, 
which are machines that run vulnerable 
(un-patched) software with a goal of 
becoming infected with malware. The 
infected machines can then be used to 
profile malware through wither automatic 
or human means. This data is one if 
the primary sources of signatures for 
signature-based detection methods.
Honeynet nodes do not have to be a 
single machine. It is possible, through 
the use of virtual machines, to run 
large volumes of honeynet nodes on a 
relatively small amount of hardware. It is 
important to note that often the malware 
will be prevented from performing illegal 
activities (DDoS attacks etc) while under 
the researchers control.
Honeypot techniques have been widely 
used by researchers. Cooke et al. [22] 
conducted several studies of botnet 
propagation and dynamics using 
Honeypots; Barford and Yegneswaran 
[9] collected bot samples and carried 
out a detailed study on the source code 
of several families; finally, Freiling et 
al. [38] and Rajab et al. [99] carried out 
measurement studies using Honeypots. 
Collins et al. [21] present a novel botnet 
detection approach based on the 
tendency of unclean networks to contain 
compromised hosts for extended periods 
of time and hence acting as a natural 
Honeypot for various botnets. However 
Honeypot-based approaches are limited 
by their ability to attract botnets that 
depend on human action for an infection 
to take place, an increasingly popular 
aspect of the attack vector [80].
Sandboxes
A slight variant on a honeynet is a 
malware sandbox. In this instance, 
malware is directly installed on a 
machine and the activities analysed. 
The main difference with a honeynet, 
however, is that the owner will also 
interact with the malware (for example, 
by mimicking command and control 
servers). This allows the researcher 
to gain a much bigger picture of the 
malware’s operation under different 
situations.
Reverse Engineering
Perhaps the most labour intensive, 
reverse engineering is probably the 
most useful tool in learning about 
the command and control systems 
of malware. Many of the examples 
of command and control systems 
discussed in the previous section 
were discovered through reverse 
engineering. To reverse engineer 
malware, the researcher will analyse the 
actual malware binary, and attempt to 
recover the source code. This can give 
valuable insights into the operation of 
the malware, and can even give vital 
information such as hardcoded C&C 
server addresses and encryption keys. 
The main issue is that it can take a very 
long time to completely reverse engineer 
a piece of malware (and in some cases 
it may not be possible at all), and it is 
a process that is extremely difficult to 
automate.
E.3 Signature Based Methods
In signature-based detection methods, 
malware C&C is detected by looking 
for known patterns of behaviour, or 
“Signatures”. Signatures are generated 
for known malware samples, and 
then new traffic is compared to these 
signatures. If the new traffic matches a 
signature, then the traffic is classed as 
C2 traffic.
Signatures are generated by analysing 
confirmed C2 traffic collected from 
various sources. The main sources are 
honeynets and sandboxes. Malware 
is run in controlled conditions, and its 
activity logged. What is logged depends 
on the detection algorithm being used, 
but almost every aspect of the malware’s 
behaviour can be included in a signature. 
Some systems, for example, solely base 
signatures upon the payload data of 
packets, while others can cover entire 
flows and the timings of packets. It 
is also not the case that one piece of 
malware will be represented by a single 
signature, and vice versa. It is often 
the case that a single malware sample 
will generate multiple signatures as 
the conditions on a host machine can 
vary, which will affect the command 
and control activity. Conversely, a 
signature may represent multiple pieces 
of malware that exhibit very similar 
behaviour.
Communication Detection
As we have seen, many malware variants 
have very particular protocols when it 
comes to communication. These are 
often noticeably different to legitimate 
traffic, both in packet contents and in 
the behaviour of the communications. 
This makes signature based detection 
methods very good for detecting known 
variants of malware. Many different 
pieces of malware may also be based 
upon a common component, meaning 
that a single signature can be used to 
detect multiple pieces of similar malware.
One possibility for this kind of detection 
is to produce signatures based upon 
the contents of packets. It is often the 
case that packets of data involved in the 
C&C of malware will be almost identical 
across multiple hosts. Even though 
some malware familes use encryption in 
their communications, that encryption is 
usually a simple, lightweight algorithm 
(as the encryption is often for obscurity 
rather than security), so their are 
similarities among different ciphertexts. 
For example, in the work of Rieck et al 
[103], in which n-gram based signatures 
are generated for the payloads of 
malware that is run under controlled 
conditions in a sandbox. Signatures are 
also generated for legitimate traffic, and 
with this method the system can achieve 
detection rates of close to 95%, with a 
false positive rate of close to zero when 
running on a network gateway.
Encryption can make the detection of 
malware traffic much more difficult, 
especially if the system uses widespread 
protocols such as HTTP. One approach 
is then to attempt to decrypt all packets 
and then perform signature detection on 
the decrypted contents, as is done by 
Rossow et al [104]. They take advantage 
of the fact that in many cases the 
encryption used is very simple, and often 
the key for encryption is hardcoded 
into the malware binary. They keys are 
fetched by reverse engineering, and 
then the payloads can be decrypted, 
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ans signature-based detection applied. 
The obvious down- side to this method 
is that it requires the labour intensive 
reverse engineeing step. 
Further to this, Rafique et al. [102] 
proposed a system for large-scale 
automatic signature generation. The 
system uses network traces collected 
from sandboxes and produces 
signatures for groups of similar malware, 
covering numerous protocols. This 
system is able to identify numerous 
malware example with a high rate, and 
experiences a low false positive rate 
due to the specificness of the signatures 
generated. The signatures are designed 
to be exported to intrusion detection 
systems such as Snort for on-line 
detection.
Spam Detection
There have also been attempts at 
performing spam detection based 
upon the method that the spam email 
was sent, which is quite often through 
malware. The work of Stringhini et al 
[118] utilises the fact that many different 
mail clients, including malware, introduce 
slight variations into the standard SMTP 
protocol. They use this to produce 
“dialects”, which are signatures for 
each mail client that can represent 
these variations. Dialects are collected 
for known sources of spam, including 
malware, and also for legitimate mail 
services. It is then a simple case of 
matching incoming emails to a dialect to 
make the decision of if the email is spam. 
In a further piece of work from the same 
authors [119], they propose a different 
approach ion BotMagnifier. This system 
first clusters spam messages according 
to their content, and then measures the 
source and destination IP addresses 
to match clusters to known botnets. 
This allows for both the enumeration of 
known botnets, and the discovery of new 
ones. It is of course the case that many 
spam campaigns could originate from 
the same botnet, so clusters that share 
source IPs are liked to the same botnet. 
It also is observed that a particular 
botnet will often target a particular set 
of destinations, such as one particular 
country, which is used to add precision.
Server Detection
Nelms et al. [86] propose ExecScent, a 
system for identifying malicious domains 
within network traffic. The system works 
by creating network traces from known 
malware samples to create signatures, 
that can then be compared with network 
traffic. The sig- natures are not just 
based upon the domain names, but 
also the full HTTP requests associated 
with them. How this system is unique, 
however, is that the signatures are 
tailored to the network that they will be 
used on based upon the background 
network traffic. This step is extremely 
useful at reducing the level of false 
positives by exploiting the fact that 
different networks will exhibit different 
browsing behaviour (for example a car 
manufacturer is unlikely to visit the same 
websites as a hospital).
E.4 Non-Signature Based 
Methods
The main disadvantage of using a 
signature based detection method 
is that these detection systems are 
usually not very effective at detecting 
new, or updated, malware. Every time 
a new piece of malware is discovered, 
or an exiting piece updates itself, the 
signatures have to be recreated. If the 
new variant is not discovered, then it is 
unlikely to be detected by these systems. 
This is where non-signature based 
detection comes in. In these systems, 
the algorithms look for behaviour that 
is not expected, rather than looking for 
particular known behaviour, or looking for 
a specific type of behaviour without the 
use of signatures. 
Server Detection: DNS
There has been a large amount of work 
that attempts to provide a detection 
mechanism that can identify domains 
associated with malware at the DNS 
level. As we have seen, DNS is used by a 
large amount of malware that makes use 
of a centralised command and control 
structure.
One proposed detection method 
is to make use of the reputation of 
domain names to decide if they are 
related to malicious activities [6]. In 
this system (Notos), domains are 
clustered in two ways. First, they are 
clustered according to the IP addresses 
associated with them. Secondly, they 
are clustered according to similarities 
in the syntactic structure of the domain 
names themselves. These clusters 
are then classified as malicious or not 
based upon a collection of whitelists 
and blacklists: domains in a cluster that 
contains blacklist domains are likely to 
be malicious themselves. This system 
is run on local DNS servers and can 
achieve a true positive rate of 96% and 
an low false positive rate. In a further 
piece of work from the same authors as 
Notos, the idea is vastly expanded to 
use the global view of the upper DNS 
hierarchy. In this new system (Kopis) [7], 
a classifier is built that, instead of looking 
at the domains’ IP and name, looks at 
the hosts that make the DNS requests. 
They leverage the fact that malware-
related domains are likely to have an 
inconsistent, varied pool of requesting 
hosts, compared to a legitimate domain 
which will be much more consistent. 
They also look at the locations of the 
requesters: requesters inside large 
networks are given higher weighting as 
a large network is more likely to contain 
infected machines. When tested, this 
system was actually able to identify a 
new botnet based in China, which was 
later removed from the internet.
DNS is also used in another way by 
malware controllers that we have not yet 
mentioned. One feature of DNS is DNS 
blacklists (DNSBL). These are used by 
spam filters to block emails from known 
malicious IPS. The malware controllers 
will often query these blacklists for IPs 
under their control to test their own 
networks [101]. The behaviour of a 
botmaster performing DNS lookups for 
his own hosts will differ from legitimate 
use of DNSBLs. For example, a 
malicious host performing DNS lookups 
on behalf of the controller will perform 
lots of queries, but will not be queried 
itself, while a legitimate service will 
receive incoming queries. This behaviour 
is relatively easy to detect by simply 
looking for queries that exhibit this 
behaviour.
Paxson et al [89] attempt to provide a 
detection mechanism that leverages 
the amount of information transmitted 
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over a DNS channel in order to detect 
suspicious flows. The system allows 
for a upper bound to be set, any DNS 
flow that exceeds this barrier is flagged 
for inspection. The upper bound can 
be circumvented by limiting flows, but 
this has an impact the amount of data 
exfiltration/command issuing that can 
occur. The system looks primarily at data 
included within domain names, but also 
looks at interquery timings and DNS 
packet field values, both of which can 
provide low capacity channels.Several 
other works seek to exploit DNS usage 
patterns. Dagon et al. [26] studied the 
propagation rates of malware released 
at different times by redirecting DNS 
traffic for bot domain names. Their use 
of DNS sinkholes is useful in measuring 
new deployments of a known botnet. 
However, this approach requires a priori 
knowledge of botnet domain names 
and negotiations with DNS operators 
and hence does not target scaling to 
networks where a botnet can simply 
change domain names, have a large 
pool of C&C IP addresses and change 
the domain name generation algorithm 
by remotely patching the bot. DNS 
blacklists and phishing blacklists [110], 
while initially effective have are becoming 
increasingly ineffective [100] owing to 
the agility of the attackers. Much more 
recently, Villamar et al. [128] applied 
Bayesian methods to isolate centralised 
botnets that use fast-flux to counter DNS 
blacklists, based on the similarity of their 
DNS traffic with a given corpus of known 
DNS botnet traces.
Fast Flux
As we recall, in a fast flux network 
the command and control server is 
hidden behind a proxy of numerous 
compromised hosts. Performing DNS 
queries on the domain of the server will 
return a large, and constantly changing, 
set of IP addresses. As you may expect, 
this type of behaviour is relatively easy to 
detect.
As we discussed, there are some 
differences between fast-flux service 
networks (FFSNs) and content delivery 
networks (CDNs) [51]. To detect a FFSN 
is a simple process, due to the two 
characteristics of an FFSN: short TTL 
values in DNS responses and non-
overlapping DNS responses. If DNS 
traffic is monitored, then by simply 
looking for DNS responses for domains 
that meet this criteria will indicate a 
possible FFSN. This can also be done 
manually for individual suspect domains 
by generating multiple DNS queries.
This will give two pieces of information. 
The main result is that domains can be 
identified as being behind FFSNs and 
therefore added to blacklists. Secondly, 
the returned IP addresses will be those 
of likely compromised machines, which 
are quite possibly part of a botnet. 
This list can be compared with internal 
networks to identify and mitigate 
compromised machines, and also 
enumerate the botnet.
It is also possible to automatically 
detect which domains belong to the 
same FFSN. The work or Perdisci et al 
[90] applies clustering to domains so 
they are grouped according to overlap 
in the returned IP addresses. By then 
comparing the clusters to previously 
labelled data, they can then be classified 
as flux or non-flux, revealing domains 
that make use of the same network. 
Host Detection
An interesting system for host detection 
is BotHunter [44]. BotHunter is a system 
for identifying compromised hosts 
based upon the actions they perform, 
more specifically the pattern of infection 
and initial connection to a command 
and control server. There are 5 steps 
to this patter: inbound scan, inbound 
exploit, binary download, outbound 
C&C communication and outbound 
infection scanning (for propagation). 
These steps are identified as being 
an good generalisation of the typical 
infection model for a botnet (although 
some botnets will obviously leave out or 
add extra steps). The system works by 
correlating IDS alerts and the payloads 
of request packets. These are used to 
identify hosts performing the 5 steps, 
and if a host is found to perform certain 
combinations of these within a time 
period, they are identified as a possible 
bot. The timer is used as legitimate 
services may give the appearance of 
performing one of these steps. There 
are two conditions for a host to be 
labelled as compromised. The first is 
that it has been the victim of an inbound 
exploit, and has at least one occurrence 
of outward C&C communication or 
propagation. The second is that it has 
at least two distinct signs of outward 
bot coordination or attack propagation. 
This system can achieve 95% detection 
rates, and low false positive rates. The 
downside, however, is that as it is heavily 
reliant on detecting the behaviour of 
existing botnets it can be evaded by 
slowing down the infection process to 
fall outside the time limits. BotHunter is 
available as an open source product.
The BotHunter authors produced a 
further system, BotMiner [43], that 
detects infected hosts without previous 
knowledge of botnets. In this system, 
bots are identified by clustering hosts 
that exhibit similar communication 
and (possible) malicious activities. The 
clustering allows hosts to be groups 
according to the botnet that they belong 
to as hosts within the same botnet will 
have similar communication patterns, 
and will usually perfrom the same 
activities at the same time (such as a 
DDoS attack).
Finally, there are also schemes that 
combine network and host-based 
approaches. The work of Stinson et al. 
[112] attempts to discriminate between 
locally-initiated versus remotely-
initiated actions by tracking data 
arriving over the network being used 
as system call arguments using taint 
tracking methods. Following a similar 
approach, Gummadi et al. [48] whitelist 
application traffic by identifying and 
attesting humangenerated traffic from 
a host which allows an application 
server to selectively respond to service 
requests. Finally, John et al. [61] present 
a technique to defend against spam 
botnets by automating the generation 
of spam feeds by directing an incoming 
spam feed into a Honeynet, then 
downloading bots spreading through 
those messages and then using the 
outbound spam generated to create a 
better feed.
Graph-based approaches
Several works [20, 56, 57, 60, 138] 
have previously applied graph analysis 
to detect botnets. The technique of 
Collins and Reiter [20] detects anomalies 
induced in a graph of protocol specific 
flows by a botnet control traffic. They 
suggest that a botnet can be detected 
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based on the observation that an 
attacker will increase the number of 
connected graph components due to 
a sudden growth of edges between 
unlikely neighbouring nodes. While it 
depends on being able to accurately 
model valid network growth, this is a 
powerful approach because it avoids 
depending on protocol semantics or 
packet statistics. However this work only 
makes minimal use of spatial relationship 
information. Additionally, the need 
for historical record keeping makes it 
challenging in scenarios where the victim 
network is already infected when it seeks 
help and hasn’t stored past traffic data, 
while our scheme can be used to detect 
pre-existing botnets as well. Illiofotou 
et al. [56,57] also exploit dynamicity of 
traffic graphs to classify network flows 
in order to detect P2P networks. It uses 
static (spatial) and dynamic (temporal) 
metrics centred on node and edge 
level metrics in addition to the largest-
connected-component-size as a graph 
level metric. Our scheme however 
starts from first principles (searching 
for expanders) and uses the full extent 
of spatial relationships to discover 
P2P graphs including the joint degree 
distribution and the joint-joint degree 
distribution and so on.
Of the many botnet detection and 
mitigation techniques mentioned above, 
most are rather ad	hoc and only apply 
to specific scenarios of centralised 
botnets such as IRC/HTTP/FTP botnets, 
although studies [42] indicate that the 
centralised model is giving way to the 
P2P model. Of the techniques that 
do address P2P botnets, detection is 
again dependent on specifics regarding 
control traffic ports, network behaviour 
of certain types of botnets, reverse 
engineering botnet protocols and so on, 
which limits the applicability of these 
techniques. Generic schemes such as 
BotMiner [43] and TAMD [135] using 
behaviour based clustering are better 
off but need access to extensive flow 
information which can have legal and 
privacy implications. It is also important 
to think about possible defences that 
botmasters can apply, the cost of these 
defences and how they might affect 
the efficiency of detection. Shear and 
Nicol [87, 107] describe schemes to 
mask the statistical characteristics of 
real traffic by embedding it in synthetic, 
encrypted, cover traffic. The adoption 
of such schemes will only require 
minimal alterations to existing botnet 
architectures but can effectively defend 
against detection schemes that depend 
on packet level statistics including 
BotMiner and TAMD.
E.5 Host Detection
An initial defence against botnets is to 
prevent systems from being infected 
in the first place. Anti-virus software, 
firewalls, filesystem intrusion detection 
systems, and vulnerability patches help, 
but completely preventing infection is 
very difficult task. Malware authors use 
encryption [136] and polymorphism [123] 
among other obfuscation techniques 
[123] to thwart static analysis based 
approaches used by anti-virus software. 
In response, dynamic analysis (see 
Vasudevan et al. [126] and references 
therein) overcomes obfuscations that 
prevent static analysis. Malware authors 
have countered this by employing trigger 
based behaviour such as bot command 
inputs and logic bombs which exploit 
analyzer limitations of only observing a 
single execution path. These limitations 
are overcome by analyzing multiple 
execution paths [14, 78], but bots may in 
turn counter this using schemes relying 
on the principles of secure triggers 
[39, 109]. In order to remain invisible to 
detection, bots can also use a variety of 
VM (Virtual Machine) based techniques 
for extra stealth, such as installing 
virtual machines underneath the existing 
operating system [65] to prevent access 
from software running on the target 
system and being able to identify a 
virtual analysis environment including 
VMs and Honeypots [36]. Graph analysis 
techniques have also been used in 
host-based approaches. BLINC [62] is 
a traffic-classification method that uses 
“Graphlets” to model flow characteristics 
of a host and touches on the benefit 
of analyzing the “IP social-network” 
of a machine. Graph analysis has also 
been applied to automated malware 
classification based on function call 
graphs [54].
One of the areas that is most important 
to organisations is to identify hosts that 
are infected malware so appropriate 
actions can be taken. It is important to 
note here that we are only interested in 
host detection through the command 
and control actions of the malware, NOT 
the actual infection of the malware itself 
through binary detection (as is covered 
by anti-virus software).
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Over the years, a number of security 
standards, recommendations, and 
best practices have been proposed 
to address security risks. In particular, 
the Council on CyberSecurity (CCS) 
publishes and manages the “Critical 
Controls for Effective Cyber Defence 
v4.1” [23], a list of key actions that 
organisations should take to detect, 
block, or mitigate attacks. The controls 
are informed from experience with actual 
attacks, as provided by a broad range of 
contributors to the list, and are designed 
so that they can be implemented, 
enforced and monitored largely in an 
automated fashion. These controls 
are recommended by UK Government 
for improving cyber defences in all 
organisations.
Hereinafter, we will review the Controls in 
the context of detecting and disrupting 
C2 activity. We will base our review on 
version 4.1 of the Controls, the latest 
available at the time of writing. More 
precisely, we will highlight the controls 
that appear suited at defending against 
C2: we will reflect on their effectiveness 
and on their practical applicability on the 
basis of the C2 techniques that we have 
discussed so far. 
F.1 Controls for C2 Detection
Critical Control 5: Malware Defences 
Control 5 is a very broad control that 
encompasses processes and tools for 
detecting, preventing, or correcting 
the installation and execution of 
malicious software on all devices of an 
organisation.
Some of the actions it recommends are 
related to the prevention of infections 
(e.g., keeping systems and defence 
tools up to date, disabling auto-run 
mechanisms and preforming automatic 
scans of removable media, emails, and 
web pages, deploying anti-exploitation 
techniques). Several actions can instead 
be used to specifically detect and disrupt 
C2 activity:
• Monitoring all inbound and 
outbound traffic on a continuous 
basis. The control specifically 
suggests to watch large transfers of 
data or unauthorised traffic, which 
may happen during the exfiltration 
phase of an attack.
• Detecting anomalies in network 
flows. The control recommends to 
look for anomalies in the network 
traffic which may be indicative 
of malware activity (such as C2 
communications) or of compromised 
machines.
• Logging DNS queries and applying 
reputation checks. The control 
suggests to monitor DNS requests 
for attempts to resolve known 
malicious domains or attempts 
to contact domains with poor 
reputation.
Critical Control 13: Boundary Defence 
Control 13 is concerned with detecting 
and preventing information flows at an 
organisation boundaries that may violate 
the organisation’s security policies. 
More specifically, it can be used to 
identify signs of attacks and evidence of 
compromise.
The practical actions that this control 
recommends include: 
• Using blacklists to deny 
communication from internal 
machines toward known malicious 
hosts.
• Storing network traffic and alerts in 
logs analytics systems for further 
analysis and inspection.
• Deploying NIDS to monitor the 
network traffic looking for signs of 
infection.
• Capturing and analysing netflow 
data to identify anomalous activity.
• Configuring the network so that all 
outgoing traffic passes through a 
“choke point” and so that it can be 
segmented to prevent and contain 
infections. 
Critical Control 17: Data Loss 
Prevention 
The goal of control 17 is to track, control, 
prevent, and correct data transmissions 
and storage that violate an organisation’s 
security policy. Since stealing sensitive 
data is the final objective of most 
targeted attacks, the recommendations 
of this control are clearly relevant in the 
context of C2 activity.
A number of actions described as part 
of this control can be effectively used to 
detect and mitigate C2 channels:
• Deploying data loss prevention 
(DLP) tools at the perimeter, to 
identify sensitive data leaving the 
organisation premises. These tools 
often search the traffic for keywords 
or data formats that are associated 
with sensitive data.
• Detecting the unauthorised use of 
encryption in network traffic. The 
rationale here is that malware may 
use encryption to exfiltrate sensitive 
data bypassing tools (such as DLPs) 
that rely on the inspection of traffic 
content.
• Blocking access to known file 
transfer and email exfiltration sites.
• Searching for anomalies in traffic 
patterns.
F.2 Controls for C2 Disruption
Critical Control 19: Secure Network 
Engineering 
Control 19 prescribes a set of actions 
to broadly create an infrastructure that 
can withstand attacks. In particular, the 
following actions are relevant to the task 
of disrupting C2 activity:
• Segmenting the network according 
to trust zones. This activity 
can be particular beneficial if it 
possible to clearly separate high-
risk components of the network 
(e.g., parts that are particularly 
exposed to attacks) from high-value 
components (e.g., those that store 
sensitive data).
• Designing an infrastructure that 
allows the rapid deployment of new 
access controls, rules, signatures, 
etc. This is especially important to 
reap the benefits of other controls 
we have discussed: for example, to 
deploy new blacklists that have been 
available or to update the signatures 
of indicators of compromise used in 
network-based monitors.
• Ensure that clients query internal 
DNS servers, which can be 
monitored and whose replies can 
be manipulated to, for example, 
prevent access to known malicious 
or unauthorised domains.
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F.3 Other Controls
The Critical Control list includes a few 
other controls that are not immediately 
related to the detection or disruption of 
C2 activity, but that are often associated 
to the defence against targeted attacks.
More precisely, Control	9	(Security	Skills	
Assessment	and	Appropriate	Training	
to	Fill	Gaps) recommends training 
employees and organisation members 
to be aware of attacks. Intuitively better 
awareness can help avoiding human 
mistakes. However, the effectiveness of 
security training in general is debated 
[108], and the characteristics of targeted 
attacks may make training even less 
effective (e.g., attacks are more likely to 
resemble normal activity). Some case 
studies describing training programs 
specifically designed with targeted 
attacks in mind have been described in 
the literature [111].
Critical	Control	18	(Incident	Response	
and	Management) indicates a list of 
actions for responding to incidents. 
Clearly, having a well defined plan to 
deal with the detection of C2 activity 
is necessary to avoid or minimise 
the damages of an attack or ongoing 
infection.
Finally, Critical	Control	20	(Penetration	
Tests	and	Red	Team	Exercises) should 
also be taken in account in the context 
of C2 activity as a way to test the 
effectiveness of the techniques and tools 
used within an organisation. In particular, 
such security exercises should test 
whether attempts to set up C2 channels, 
using both known and new techniques 
or variations on existing techniques, 
would be detected by the other controls 
employed by the organisation. 
F.4 Discussion
Limitations 
Our review of the Critical Controls shows 
that while they do include sensible 
advice on defending against C2 activity, 
they also have some limitations that 
may hinder their effective adoption. For 
the most part, these limitations seem a 
consequence of the general nature of 
the 20 Critical Controls, which are not 
tailored to C2 activity specifically.
First, controls are often extremely 
broad, encompassing a wide variety 
of technologies and approaches. For 
example, the activities listed in Control 
5 encompass whole sectors of the 
information security industry, ranging 
from anti-virus technologies, intrusion 
detection systems, reputation systems, 
and anomaly detection. This is not a 
problem per se: the use of orthogonal 
mechanisms (“defence in depth”) has 
long been considered good practice. 
However, extracting techniques that are 
specific for C2 detection and disruption 
among the full list of controls may 
become daunting.
Similarly, activities that are relevant 
for C2 detection are scattered through 
several controls, which makes it more 
difficult for someone focusing on C2 to 
ensure that all relevant controls have 
been implemented or considered.
Finally, the Controls document provides 
little discussion of the limitations inherent 
in the controls it proposes. While the 
metric and test sections in each control 
provide a discussion of how to measure 
and test the effectiveness of a control, it 
may be easy for a reader to focus on the 
defensive mechanisms rather than on the 
results that they provide. 
Generalization of controls for C2 
detection and disruption 
From our discussion of C2 techniques 
and defences, it is evident that most 
approaches to the detection of C2 
activity rely on monitoring network traffic 
and applying some form of detection 
algorithm on it. The Security Controls do 
include activities that lead organisations 
toward this approach to security; here, 
we will generalise and comment on these 
recommendations: 
• Monitor all inbound and outbound 
traffic. More precisely, it is important 
to inspect inbound traffic for signs of 
attacks that may lead to an infection, 
for ex- ample, drive-by-download or 
spear phishing attacks. Outbound 
traffic should be analysed looking 
for indications that a C2 channel has 
been established (data ex- filtration, 
Command & Control check-in, etc.)
• Monitor network activity to identify 
connection attempts to known-
bad end points, i.e., IPs and 
domains that are known to be 
used in attacks. The rationale is 
that access to these endpoints 
can be prevented, assuming that 
appropriate mechanisms are in 
place (e.g., firewalls). The key aspect 
here is of course that of creating 
and maintaining up-to-date lists 
of malicious endpoints. Different 
approaches to create and evaluate 
such lists have been proposed 
both in the academia and in the 
commercial sector [32, 58, 68, 95, 
113, 124].
• Identify and inspect anomalies in 
the network traffic. The rationale 
is that targeted attacks rely on 
infrastructure that is less likely to be 
included in generally- available lists 
of malicious endpoints or to use C2 
techniques (e.g., protocols) that are 
used also by general malware. Then, 
focusing on detecting anomalous 
traffic would enable defenders to 
catch these novel threats. There are 
two assumptions underlying this 
recommendation: targeted attacks 
result in anomalous traffic and 
anomalous traffic is an indication 
of compromise. Both assumptions 
may need to be re-evaluated from 
time to time: we have seen that 
attackers are devising new methods 
to “blend in” with the normal traffic; 
the characteristics of traffic on 
a network may change as new 
services and devices are introduced.
• Collect specific subsets of network 
traffic, in particular DNS queries 
and netflow data. A motivation 
for this recommendation is that it 
may be easier to collect such data, 
rather than setting up a full network 
monitoring system. As we have seen 
from our literature review, several 
approaches have been devised to 
identify C2 traffic based on these 
inputs.
• Architect the network in such a way 
that simplifies traffic monitoring 
and the activation of responses to 
attacks. For example, by having a 
single choke point where all traffic 
passes through, an organisation 
can simplify the full collection of 
traffic and its inspection. As another 
example, network segmentation 
can help keeping separated 
networks of different trust values 
(e.g., networks hosting front- facing 
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servers vs. those hosting internal 
services). In addition, the use of rate 
limiting techniques may slow down 
attackers as they try to exfiltrate 
data and increase the window of 
time in which a detection can occur.
Risks 
There are several factors that may limit 
the effectiveness of a control. Attackers 
are always looking for ways to “remain 
under the radar” and avoid detection. 
For example, to limit the effectiveness of 
content analysis techniques, they may 
use encrypted communication protocols, 
or they may adapt their C2 traffic so 
that it resembles regular traffic seen on 
a network. To thwart controls that call 
for matching traffic (e.g., connection 
endpoints, DNS queries) against lists 
of known malicious entities, attackers 
refrain from re-using artefacts (such 
as actual attack vectors, servers, and 
domain names) in multiple attacks. 
To work around anomaly detection 
approaches, attackers may make their 
activities, in particular their C2 traffic, 
similar to benign traffic.
Practical matters 
We will conclude our review of security 
controls with a discussion of some 
non technical issues that may face an 
adopter of the controls. For example, 
an organisation may not have sufficient 
resources (staff, time, or money) to 
apply a control in its entirety. In addition, 
implementing a control may require 
changes to or collaboration from a 
multitude of departments or groups 
inside organisation. For example, 
monitoring DNS queries may require 
that the security group interacts with the 
networking group. It would be helpful 
to have some guidance on addressing 
such issues, perhaps in the form of case 
studies.
An approach that we have seen applied 
successfully to the introduction of 
new controls for C2 activity could be 
summarised as “start small, measure, 
and scale up”. An organisation does 
not need to apply a control throughout 
its entire infrastructure (start	small): for 
example, it could choose to initially 
protect a subset of users, such as 
a high-risk group, or a group that is 
tolerant to initial experimentation with 
potentially higher than normal false 
positive rates. Similarly, an organisation 
could choose to focus on a specific type 
of traffic (e.g., DNS) that has smaller 
performance requirements and still a 
good potential of leading to the detection 
of C2 channel activity. After the initial, 
limited implementation of a control, 
its effectiveness should be assessed 
(measure). If successful, the control 
could be extended to larger portions of 
the organisation (scale	up).
PAGE 26 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
[1] At&t global networking facts. http:www.corp.att.com/gov/about_ 
ags/fact_sheet.
[2] K.Adams,T.Garfinkel,A.Warfield,andJ.Franklin.
CompatibilityisNotTrans- parency: VMM Detection Myths and 
Realities. In Proc.	of	the	USENIX	Work-	shop	on	Hot	Topics	in	
Operating	Systems	(HotOS),	2007.
[3] R. Albert and A. Baraba ́si. Statistical mechanics of complex 
networks. Reviews	of	Modern	Physics, 74(1):47–97, 2002.
[4] R. Anderson, C. Barton, R. Bo ̈hme, R. Clayton, M. J. van Eeten, 
M. Levi, T. Moore, and S. Savage. Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime. 
In Proc.	of	the	Workshop	on	the	Economics	of	Information	Security	
(WEIS), 2012.
[5] R. Anderson, R. Bo ̈hme, R. Clayton, and T. Moore. Security 
Economics and the Internal Market. Technical report, ENISA, 2008.
[6] M. Antonakakis, R. Perdisci, D. Dagon, W. Lee, and N. Feamster. 
Building a dynamic reputation system for dns. In Proc.	of	the	USENIX	
Security	Symposium, 2010.
[7] M. Antonakakis, R. Perdisci, W. Lee, N. Vasiloglou, and D. Dagon. 
Detecting Malware Domains at the Upper DNS Hierarchy. In Proc.	of	
the	USENIX	Security	Symposium, 2011.
[8] D. Balzarotti, M. Cova, C. Karlberger, C. Kruegel, E. Kirda, and G. 
Vigna. Effi- cient Detection of Split Personalities in Malware. In Proc.	of	
the	Symposium	on	Network	and	Distributed	System	Security	(NDSS), 
2010.
[9] P. Barford and V. Yegneswaran. An	Inside	Look	at	Botnets, volume 
27 of Ad-	vanced	in	Information	Security. Springer, 2006.
[10] A. Barsamian. Network characterization for botnet detection using 
statistical- behavioral methods. Masters thesis, Thayer School of 
Engineering, Dartmouth College, USA, June 2009.
[11] L. Bilge and T. Dumitras. Before We Knew It: An Empirical 
Study of Zero-Day Attacks in the Real World. In Proc.	of	the	ACM	
Conference	on	Computer	and	Communications	Security (CCS), 2012.
[12] J. R. Binkley and S. Singh. An algorithm for anomaly-based botnet 
detection. In
SRUTI’06: Proceedings	of	the	2nd	conference	on	Steps	to	Reducing	
Unwanted	Traffic	on	the	Internet, pages 7–7, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2006. 
PAGE 27 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
USENIX Associa- tion.
[13] J. Brenner. America	the	Vulnerable:	Inside	the	New	Threat	Matrix	
of	Digital	Espionage,	Crime,	and	Warfare. The Penguin Press HC, 
2011.
[14] D. Brumley, C. Hartwig, Z. Liang, J. Newsome, D. X. Song, and H. 
Yin. Au- tomatically identifying trigger-based behavior in malware. In 
Botnet	Detection, pages 65–88. 2008.
[15] California State Senate. Assembly Bill 700. http://www.leginfo. 
ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_0651-0700/ab_700_bill_ 20020929_
chaptered.pdf.
[16] M. Castro, P. Druschel, A. Ganesh, A. Rowstron, and D. S. 
Wallach. Secure routing for structured peer-to-peer overlay networks. 
In Proceedings	of	the	5th	Symposium	on	Operating	Systems	Design	
and	Implementation, dec 2002.
[17] Cisco Systems Inc. Cisco IOS Netflow. http://www.cisco.com/
web/ go/netflow.
[18] R. Clarke. Cyber	War:	The	Next	Threat	to	National	Security	and	
What	to	Do	About	It. Ecco, 2010.
[19] M. Cloppert. Security Intelligence: Attacking the Cyber Kill Chain.
http://computer-forensics.sans.org/blog/2009/10/14/ security-
intelligence-attacking-the-kill-chain, 2009.
[20] M. P. Collins and M. K. Reiter. Hit-list worm detection and bot 
identification in large networks using protocol graphs. In RAID, 2007.
[21] M. P. Collins, T. J. Shimeall, S. Faber, J. Janies, R. Weaver, M. De 
Shon, and J. Kadane. Using uncleanliness to predict future botnet 
addresses. In IMC, pages 93–104, New York, NY, USA, 2007. ACM.
[22] E. Cooke and F. Jahanian. The zombie roundup: Understanding, 
detecting, and disrupting botnets. In Steps	to	Reducing	Unwanted	
Traffic	on	the	Internet	Workshop, 2005.
[23] Council on CyberSecurity. Critical Controls for Effective Cyber 
Defense — Version 4.1. Technical report, Council on CyberSecurity, 
2013.
[24] M. Cova, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. There Is No Free Phish: An 
Analysis of “Free” and Live Phishing Kits. In Proc. of	the	USENIX	
Workshop	on	Offensive	Technologies	(WOOT), 2008.
PAGE 28 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
[25] C. Cranor, T. Johnson, O. Spataschek, and V. Shkapenyuk. 
Gigascope: a stream database for network applications. In 
Proceedings	of	the	2003	ACM	SIGMOD	international	conference	on	
Management	of	data, SIGMOD ’03, pages 647–651, New York, NY, 
USA, 2003. ACM.
(CCS), 2012.
[26] D. Dagon, C. Zou, and W. Lee. Modeling botnet propagation using 
time zones. In Network	and	Distributed	Systems	Security	Symposium, 
2006.
[27] Detica and the Office of Cyber Security and Information 
Assurance in the Cabi- net Office. The cost of cyber crime. http://
www.cabinetoffice.gov. uk/resource-library/cost-of-cyber-crime, 
2011.
[28] C. J. Dietrich. Feederbot - a bot using DNS as carrier for its C&C. 
http://blog.cj2s.de/archives/28-Feederbot-a-bot- using-DNS-as-
carrier-for-its-CC.html, 2011.
[29] R. Dingledine. Many more Tor users in the past week? https: //
lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2013- August/029582.html, 
2013.
[30] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson. Tor: The second-
generation onion router. In Proceedings	of	the	13th	USENIX	Security	
Symposium, Aug. 2004.
[31] M.Egele,T.Scholte,E.Kirda,andC.Kruegel.ASurveyon Automated 
Dynamic Malware Analysis Techniques and Tools. ACM	Computing	
Surveys, 44(2), 2012.
[32] M.Felegyhazi,C.Kreibich,andV.Paxson.
OnthePotentialofProactiveDomain Blacklisting. 2010.
[33] P. Ferrie. Attacks on More Virtual Machine Emulators. Technical 
report, Syman- tec, 2007.
[34] P. Ferrie. Attacks on Virtual Machines. In Proceedings	of	the	
Association	of	Anti-Virus	Asia	Researchers	Conference, 2007.
[35] M. Fossi, E. Johnson, D. Turner, T. Mack, J. Blackbird, D. 
McKinney, M. K. Low, T. Adams, M. P. Laucht, and J. Gough. 
Symantec Report on the Underground Economy. Technical report, 
Symantec, Inc., 2008.
PAGE 29 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
[36] J. Franklin, M. Luk, J. M. McCune, A. Seshadri, A. Perrig, and L. 
van Doorn. Towards sound detection of virtual machines. In Botnet	
Detection. 2008.
[37] J. Franklin, V. Paxson, A. Perrig, and S. Savage. An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Internet Miscreants. In Proc. 
of the ACM	Conference	on	Computer	and	Communications	Security 
(CCS), 2007.
[38] F. C. Freiling, T. Hoz, and G. Wichereski. Botnet tracking: 
Exploring a root- cause methodology to prevent distributed denial-of-
service attacks. In European	Symposium	on	Research	in	Computer	
Security, 2005.
[39] A. Futoransky, E. Kargieman, C. Sarraute, and A. Waissbein. 
Foundations and applications for secure triggers. ACM Trans. Inf. 
Syst. Secur., 9(1):94–112, 2006.
[40] J. Goebel and T. Holz. Rishi: Identify bot contaminated hosts by 
IRC nickname evaluation. In Hot	Topics	in	Understanding	Botnets, Apr. 
2007.
[41] C. Grier, L. Ballard, J. Caballero, N. Chachra, C. J. Dietrich, 
K. Levchenko, P. Mavrommatis, D. McCoy, A. Nappa, A. Pitsillidis, 
N. Provos, M. Z. Raque, M. A. Rajab, C. Rossow, K. Thomas, V. 
Paxson, S. Savage, and G. M. Voelker. Manufacturing Cpromise: The 
Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service . In Proc.	of	the	ACM	Conference	
on	Computer	and	Communications	Security (CCS), 2012.
[42] J. B. Grizzard, V. Sharma, C. Nunnery, B. B. Kang, and D. Dagon. 
Peer-to-peer botnets: Overview and case study. In Hot Topics	in	
Understanding	Botnets, Apr. 2007.
[43] G. Gu, R. Perdisci, J. Zhang, and W. Lee. BotMiner: Clustering 
Analysis of Network Traffic for Protocol- and Structure-Independent 
Botnet Detection. In	Proc.	of	the	USENIX	Security	Symposium, 2008.
[44] G. Gu, P. Porras, V. Yegneswaran, M. Fong, and W. Lee. 
BotHunter: Detect- ing Malware Infection Through IDS-Driven Dialog 
Correlation. In Proc.	of	the	USENIX	Security	Symposium, 2007.
[45] G. Gu, J. Zhang, and W. Lee. BotSniffer: Detecting botnet 
command and control channels in network traffic. In Proceedings	of	
the	15th	Annual	Network	and	Distributed	System	Security	Symposium 
(NDSS’08), February 2008.
[46] C. Guarnieri. Skynet, a Tor-powered Botnet Straight from Reddit.
PAGE 30 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
https://community.rapid7.com/community/infosec/blog/ 
2012/12/06/skynet-a-tor-powered-botnet-straight- from-reddit, 
2012.
[47] K. P. Gummadi, R. Gummadi, S. D. Gribble, S. Ratnasamy, S. 
Shenker, and I. Stoica. The impact of DHT routing geometry on 
resilience and proximity. In Proceedings	of	ACM	SIGCOMM	2003, 
Aug. 2003.
[48] R.Gummadi,H.Balakrishnan,P.Maniatis,andS.Ratnasamy.Not-a-
Bot(NAB): Improving Service Availability in the Face of Botnet Attacks. 
In NSDI	2009, Boston, MA, April 2009.
[49] M. Hanspach and M. Goetz. On covert acoustical mesh networks 
in air. Journal	of	Communications, 8:758–767, 2013.
[50] T. Holz, M. Engelberth, and F. Freiling. Learning More About the 
Underground Economy: A Case-Study of Keyloggers and Dropzones. 
In Proc.	of	the	European	Symposium	on	Research	in	Computer	
Security	(ESORICS), 2009.
[51] T. Holz, C. Gorecki, K. Rieck, and F. Freiling. Measuring and 
Detecting FastFlux Service Networks. In Proc.	of	the	Symposium	on	
Network	and	Distributed	System	Security	(NDSS), 2008.
[52] C. Hosmer. Polymorphic & Metamorphic Malware. In Proceedings	
of	the	Black	Hat	Conference, 2008.
[53] A. Houmansadr, C. Brubaker, and V. Shmatikov. The parrot 
is dead: Observ- ing unobservable network communications. In 
Proceedings	of	the	2013	IEEE	Symposium	on	Security	and	Privacy, 
2013.
[54] X. Hu, T. cker Chiueh, and K. G. Shin. Large-scale malware 
indexing using function-call graphs. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM 
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2009.
[55] E. M. Hutchins, M. J. Clopperty, and R. M. Amin. Intelligence-
Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary 
Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains. Technical report, Lockheed 
Martin Corporation, 2010.
[56] M. Iliofotou, M. Faloutsos, and M. Mitzenmacher. Exploiting 
dynamicity in graph-based traffic analysis: Techniques and 
applications. In ACM CoNext, 2009.
[57] M. Iliofotou, P. Pappu, M. Faloutsos, M. Mitzenmacher, G. 
PAGE 31 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
Varghese, and H. Kim. Graption: Automated detection of P2P 
applications using traffic disper- sion graphs (TDGs). In UC	Riverside	
Technical	Report, CS-2008-06080, 2008.
[58] L. Invernizzi, S. Benvenuti, M. Cova, P. M. Comparetti, C. Kruegel, 
and G. Vi- gna. EvilSeed: A Guided Approach to Finding Malicious 
Web Pages. In Proc.	of	the	IEEE	Symposium	on	Security	and	Privacy, 
2012.
[59] JAP. Jap anon proxy. http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/ 
publications/index_en.html.
[60] M. Jelasity and V. Bilicki. Towards automated detection of peer-to-
peer botnets: On the limits of local approaches. In USENIX	Workshop	
on	Large-Scale	Exploits	and	Emergent	Threats (LEET), 2009.
[61] J. P. John, A. Moshchuk, S. D. Gribble, and A. Krishnamurthy. 
Studying spam- ming botnets using botlab. In NSDI’09: Proceedings	
of	the	6th	USENIX	sympo-	sium	on	Networked	systems	design	and	
implementation, pages 291–306, Berke- ley, CA, USA, 2009. USENIX 
Association.
[62] T. Karagiannis, K. Papagiannaki, and M. Faloutsos. BLINC: 
multilevel traffic classification in the dark. In ACM	SIGCOMM, 2005.
[63] A. Karasaridis, B. Rexroad, and D. Hoeflin. Wide-scale botnet 
detection and characterization. In Hot	Topics	in	Understanding	
Botnets, Apr. 2007.
[64] Kaspersky. Ask An Expert: The Brainstorming. http://blog. 
kaspersky.com/ask-an-expert-the-brainstorming/, 2013.
[65] S. T. King, P. M. Chen, Y.-M. Wang, C. Verbowski, H. J. Wang, 
and J. R. Lorch. Subvirt: Implementing malware with virtual machines. 
Security	and	Privacy,	IEEE	Symposium	on, 0:314–327, 2006.
[66] C. Kolbitsch, E. Kirda, and C. Kruegel. The Power of 
Procrastination: Detec- tion and Mitigation of Execution-Stalling 
Malicious Code. In Proc. of	the	ACM	Conference	on	Computer	and	
Communications	Security (CCS), 2011.
[67] B. Krebs. Security Firm Bit9 Hacked, Used to Spread Malware. 
Krebs	on	Secuity, February 13 2013.
[68] M. Ku ̈hrer and T. Holz. An Empirical Analysis of Malware 
Blacklists. Praxis	der	Informationsverarbeitung	und	Kommunikation, 
35(1), 2012.
PAGE 32 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
[69] R. Langner. To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What 
Stuxnet’s Cre- ators Tried to Achieve. Technical report, Langner 
Group, Nov. 2013.
[70] D. Loguinov, A. Kumar, V. Rai, and S. Ganesh. Graph-theoretic 
analysis of structured peer-to-peer systems: Routing distances and 
fault resilience. In Proceedings	of	ACM	SIGCOMM, Aug. 2003.
[71] W. Lu, M. Tavallaee, and A. A. Ghorbani. Automatic discovery 
of botnet communities on large-scale communication networks. In 
ASIACCS, pages 1–10, New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[72] Mandiant. 2013 Threat Report. https://www.mandiant.com/ 
resources/m-trends, 2013.
[73] Mandiant. APT1: Exposing One of Chinas Cyber Espionage Units. 
Technical report, 2013.
[74] L. Martignoni, R. Paleari, G. F. Roglia, and D. Bruschi. Testing CPU 
Emulators. In Proceedings	of	the	International	Symposium	on	Software	
Testing	and	Analysis (ISSTA), 2009.
[75] R. McCardle. A .bit odd. http://blog.trendmicro.com/ trendlabs-
security-intelligence/a-bit-odd/, 2013.
[76] M. McGuire and S. Dowling. Cyber crime: A review of the 
evidence. Research Report 75, Home Office, 2013.
[77] H. Mohajeri Moghaddam, B. Li, M. Derakhshani, and I. Goldberg. 
Skypemorph: protocol obfuscation for tor bridges. In Proceedings	of	
the	2012	ACM	conference	on	Computer	and	communications	security, 
2012.
[78] A. Moser, C. Kruegel, and E. Kirda. Exploring Multiple Execution 
Paths for Malware Analysis. In Proc. of	the	IEEE	Symposium	on	
Security	and	Privacy, 2007.
[79] C. Mullaney. Morto worm sets a (DNS) record. http://www.
symantec. com/connect/blogs/morto-worm-sets-dns-record, 
2011.
[80] S.NagarajaandR.Anderson.Thesnoopingdragon:social-
malwaresurveillance of the tibetan movement. Technical Report 
UCAM-CL-TR-746, University of Cambridge, March 2009.
[81] S. Nagaraja, A. Houmansadr, P. Piyawongwisal, V. Singh, P. 
PAGE 33 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
Agarwal, and N. Borisov. Stegobot: a covert social network botnet. In 
Information	Hiding	Conference, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
pages 112–125. Springer, 2011.
[82] S. Nagaraja, P. Mittal, C.-Y. Hong, M. Caesar, and N. Borisov. 
BotGrep: Finding P2P bots with structured graph analysis. In USENIX	
Security	Symposium, pages 95–110, 2010.
[83] E. Nakashima. Confidential report lists U.S. weapons system 
designs compromised by Chinese cyberspies. The	Washington	Post, 
May 27 2013.
[84] J. Nazario. Malicious Google AppEngine Used as a CnC. http: 
//www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2009/11/malicious- google-
appengine-used-as-a-cnc/, 2009.
[85] J. Nazario. Twitter-based Botnet Command Channel. http: //
www.arbornetworks.com/asert/2009/08/twitter-based- botnet-
command-channel/, 2009.
[86] T. Nelms, R. Perdisci, and M. Ahamad. ExecScent: Mining for 
New C&C Do- mains in Live Networks with Adaptive Control Protocol 
Templates. In Proc.	of	the	USENIX	Security	Symposium, 2013.
[87] D. M. Nicol and N. Schear. Models of privacy preserving traffic 
tunneling. Sim- ulation, 85(9):589–607, 2009.
[88] R. Paleari, L. Martignoni, G. F. Roglia, and D. Bruschi. A Fistful 
of Red-Pills: How to Automatically Generate Procedures to Detect 
CPU Emulators. In Proc.	of	the	USENIX	Workshop	on	Offensive	
Technologies (WOOT), 2009.
[89] V. Paxson, M. Christodorescu, M. Javed, J. Rao, R. Sailer, D. 
Schales, M. P. Stoecklin, K. Thomas, W. Venema, and N. Weaver. 
Practical comprehensive bounds on surreptitious communication over 
dns. In Proceedings	of	the	22Nd	USENIX	Conference	on	Security, 
2013.
[90] R. Perdisci, W. Lee, and N. Feamster. Behavioral Clustering of 
HTTP-Based Malware and Signature Generation Using Malicious 
Network Traces. In Proc.	of	the	USENIX	Symposium	on	Networked	
Systems	Design	&	Implementation, 2010.
[91] N. Perlroth. Hackers in China Attacked The Times for Last 4 
Months. The	New	York	Times, January 30 2013.
[92] M. Polychronakis, P. Mavrommatis, and N. Provos. Ghost Turns 
Zombie: Ex- ploring the Life Cycle of Web-Based Malware. In Proc.	of	
PAGE 34 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
the	USENIX	Workshop	on	Large-Scale	Exploits	and	Emergent	Threats	
(LEET), 2008.
[93] P. Porras, H. Saidi, and V. Yegneswaran. A multi-perspective 
analysis of the Storm (Peacomm) worm. In SRI	Technical	Report	10-
01, 2007.
[94] P. Porras, H. Saidi, and V. Yegneswaran. A Foray into Conficker’s 
Logic and Rendezvous Points. In Proc. of the USENIX Workshop on 
Large-Scale Exploits and Emergent Threats (LEET), 2009.
[95] N. Provos, P. Mavrommatis, M. A. Rajab, and F. Monrose. All Your 
iFrames Point to Us. In Proc.	of	the	USENIX	Security	Symposium, 
2008.
[96] N. Provos, D. McNamee, P. Mavrommatis, K. Wang, and N. 
Modadugu. The Ghost in the Browser: Analysis of Web-based 
Malware. In Proc.	of	the	USENIX	Workshop	on	Hot	Topics	in	
Understanding	Botnet, 2007.
[97] N. Provos, M. A. Rajab, and P. Mavrommatis. Cybercrime 2.0: 
When the Cloud Turns Dark. Communications	of	the	ACM, 52(4), 
2009.
[98] T. Raffetseder, C. Kruegel, and E. Kirda. Detecting System 
Emulators. In Proceedings	of	the	Information	Security	Conference, 
2007.
[99] M. Rajab, J. Zarfoss, F. Monrose, and A. Terzis. A multifaceted 
approach to understanding the botnet phenomenon. In Internet	
Measurement	Conference, 2006.
[100] A. Ramachandran, D. Dagon, and N. Feamster. Can DNS-based 
blacklists keep up with bots? In CEAS, 2006.
[101] A. Ramachandran, N. Feamster, and D. Dagon. Revealing 
Botnet Membership Using DNSBL Counter-Intelligence. In Proc. of 
the USENIX Workshop on Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the 
Internet (SRUTI), 2006.
[102] M. Z. Raque and J. Caballero. FIRMA: Malware Clustering and 
Network Signa- ture Generation with Mixed Network Behaviors. In 
Proc.	of	the	Symposium	on	Recent	Advances	in	Intrusion	Detection 
(RAID), 2013.
[103] K. Rieck, G. Schwenk, T. Limmer, T. Holz, and P. Laskov. Botzilla: 
Detecting the “Phoning Home” of Malicious Software. In Proc.	of	the	
PAGE 35 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
ACM	Symposium	on	Applied	Computing	(SAC), 2010.
[104] C. Rossow and C. J. Dietrich. ProVex: Detecting Botnets 
with Encrypted Com- mand and Control Channels. In Proc.	of	the	
Conference	on	Detection	of	Intrusions	and	Malware	&	Vulnerability	
Assessment	(DIMVA), 2013.
[105] J. Rutkowska. Red Pill... or how to detect VMM using (almost) 
one CPU in- struction. http://www.invisiblethings.org/papers/
redpill. html, 2004.
[106] D. Sanger. Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against 
Iran. The	New	York	Times, 1 June 2012.
[107] N. Schear and D. M. Nicol. Performance analysis of real 
traffic carried with encrypted cover flows. In PADS, pages 80–87, 
Washington, DC, USA, 2008. IEEE Computer Society.
[108] B. Schneier. Security Awareness Training. https://www.
schneier.com/ blog/archives/2013/03/security_awaren_1.html, 
2013.
[109] M. I. Sharif, A. Lanzi, J. T. Giffin, and W. Lee. Impeding malware 
analysis using conditional code obfuscation. In NDSS.	The	Internet	
Society, 2008.
[110] S. Sheng, B. Wardman, G. Warner, L. F. Cranor, J. Hong, and C. 
Zhang. An empirical analysis of phishing blacklists. In CEAS, 2009.
[111] A. M. Smith and N. Y. Toppel. Case Study: Using Security 
Awareness to Com- bat the Advanced Persistent Threat. In Proc. of	
the	Colloquium	for	Information	Systems	Security	Education, 2009.
[112] E. Stinson and J. C. Mitchell. Characterizing bots’ remote control 
behavior. In Botnet	Detection. 2008.
[113] J. Stokes, R. Andersen, C. Seifert, and K. Chellapilla. WebCop: 
Locating Neighborhoods of Malware on the Web. 2010.
[114] B.Stone-Gross,M.Cova,L.Cavallaro,B.Gilbert,M.Szydlowski,R.
Kemmerer, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. Your Botnet is my Botnet: 
Analysis of a Botnet Takeover. In Proc.	of	the	ACM	Conference	on	
Computer	and	Communications	Security	(CCS), 2009.
[115] B. Stone-Gross, M. Cova, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. Peering 
Through the iFrame. In Proc.	of	the	IEEE	Conference	on	Computer	
Communications	(IN-	FOCOM)	Mini-Conference, 2011.
PAGE 36 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
[116] S. Stover, D. Dittrich, J. Hernandez, and S. Dietrich. Analysis of 
the Storm and Nugache trojans: P2P is here. ;login, 32(6), Dec. 2007.
[117] W. T. Strayer, D. E. Lapsley, R. Walsh, and C. Livadas. Botnet 
detection based on network behavior. In Advances	in	Information	
Security. 2008.
[118] G. Stringhini, M. Egele, A. Zarras, T. Holz, C. Kruegel, , and G. 
Vigna. B@bel: Leveraging Email Delivery for Spam Mitigation. In Proc.	
of	the	USENIX	Security	Symposium, 2012.
[119] G.Stringhini,T.Holz,B.Stone-Gross,C.Kruegel,,andG.Vigna.
BotMagnifier: Locating Spambots on the Internet. In Proc.	of	the	
USENIX	Security	Symposium, 2011.
[120] Symantec. Internet Security Threat Report 2013 – Volume 18. 
Technical report, Symantec, Inc., 2013.
[121] Symantec. Linux back door uses covert communication 
protocol.
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/linux-back- door-uses-
covert-communication-protocol, 2013.
[122] Symantec Corp. Symantec Statement Regarding New York 
Times Cyber Attack. http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/
symantec- statement-regarding-new-york-times-cyber-attack, 
2013.
[123] P. Szor. The	Art	of	Computer	Virus	Research	and	Defense. 
Addison-Wesley Professional, 2005.
[124] K. Thomas, C. Grier, J. Ma, V. Paxson, and D. Song. Design and 
Evaluation of a Real-Time URL Spam Filtering Service. In Proc.	of	the	
IEEE	Symposium	on	Security	and	Privacy, 2011.
[125] TrendLabs APT Research Team. Spear-Phishing Email: Most 
Favored APT Attack Bait. Technical report, Trend Micro Incorporated, 
2012.
[126] A. Vasudevan and R. Yerraballi. Cobra: Fine-grained malware 
analysis using stealth localized-executions. In	Proceedings	of	2006	
IEEE	Symposium	on	Security	and	Privacy (Oakland.06, 2006.
[127] Verizon RISK Team. 2013 Data Breach Investigations Report. 
Technical report, Verizon, 2013.
PAGE 37 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
Bibliography
[128] R. Villamar ́ın-Salomo ́n and J. C. Brustoloni. Bayesian bot 
detection based on dns traffic similarity. In SAC	’09:	Proceedings	of	
the	2009	ACM	symposium	on	Applied	Computing, pages 2035–2041, 
New York, NY, USA, 2009. ACM.
[129] N. Villeneuve, N. Moran, and T. Haq. Evasive Tactics: Taidoor. 
http: //www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/2013/09/evasive- tactics-
taidoor-3.html, 2013.
[130] Q. Wang, X. Gong, G. T. Nguyen, A. Houmansadr, and N. 
Borisov. Censorspoofer: asymmetric communication using ip spoofing 
for censorship-resistant web browsing. In Proceedings of the 2012 
ACM	conference	on	Computer	and	communications	security, 2012.
[131] Z. Weinberg, J. Wang, V. Yegneswaran, L. Briesemeister, S. 
Cheung, F. Wang, and D. Boneh. Stegotorus: a camouflage proxy 
for the tor anonymity system. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM 
conference on Computer and communications security, 2012.
[132] C. Wisniewski. Twitter botnet command and control captured.
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2010/05/18/twitter- botnet-
command-control-captured/, 2010.
[133] K. Xu, P. Butler, S. Saha, and D. Yao. DNS for Massive-Scale 
Command and Control. IEEE	Transactions	on	Dependable	and	Secure	
Computing, 10(3), 2013.
[134] ydklijnsma. Large botnet cause of recent Tor network overload.
http://blog.fox-it.com/2013/09/05/large-botnet-cause- of-recent-
tor-network-overload/, 2013.
[135] T.-F. Yen and M. K. Reiter. Traffic aggregation for malware 
detection. In DIMVA ’08: Proceedings of the 5th international 
conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability 
Assessment, pages 207–227, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008. Springer-
Verlag.
[136] A. Young and M. Yung. Cryptovirology: Extortion-based security 
threats and countermeasures. In SP ’96: Proceedings	of	the	1996	IEEE	
Symposium	on	Security	and	Privacy, page 129, Washington, DC, USA, 
1996. IEEE Computer Society.
[137] E. Young and E. Ward. Trojan.Downbot. http://www.symantec.
com/ security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-052413-1248- 
99, 2011.
[138] Y. Zhao, Y. Xie, F. Yu, Q. Ke, Y. Yu, Y. Chen, and E. Gillum. 
Botgraph: Large scale spamming botnet detection. In NSDI, 2009.
PAGE 38 
Command & Control: Understanding, Denying and Detecting FEBRUARY 2014
University of Birmingham | CPNI.gov.uk
